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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
The parties to this Appeal are the Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the
Appellants and the only members and managers of Sure-Tech, L.L.C. (hereinafter,
"Sure-Tech") and EML. Projects, Ltd., Ecology Management, Ltd., Waste Products.
Inc., (hereinafter, "the Defendants") Sure-Tech, L.L.C., Steve Evans and Fred Evans
who claim to be members and managers of Sure-Tech, L.L.C., Appellees.
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IV
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction of this matter was vested in the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (3)(j), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. Jurisdiction is
now vested in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. 1953,
as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal are as follows:
Issues of Fact:
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Steve Evans, or anyone other

than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz, had authority to enter into a stipulation dismissing this
matter? (Record at page 1256).
2.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Schultz's offer to convey

ownership of Sure-Tech was not withdrawn prior to the time Evans attempted to
accept that offer? (Transcript at page 27, 59-60).
3.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Evans timely accepted Mr.

Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans?

(Transcript at page 27,

59-60).
4.

Did the trial court err in concluding that Steve Evans testified truthfully at

the May 30, 1995 hearing?

(Transcript at page 27, 59-60, record at pages 1302,1493).

Standard of Review for Issues of Fact:
Issues of fact may be reversed on appeal only if they are found to b e clearly
erroneous. Cornish Town v. KoUer, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).
Issues of Law:
1.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Evans was
4

legally entitled to act on behalf of Sure-Tech?
2.

(Record at page 1256).

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that anyone other

than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz could legally act on behalf of Sure-tech?

(Record at

p a g e 1298).
3.

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Evans had

any legal authority to stipulate to the dismissal of this matter?
4.

(Record at page 1297).

Did the trial court err as a matter of law in refusing to allow Lisa Spivey

to testify that a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to
the Evans or others had been mailed to Steve Evans, certified mail, prior to Evans'
purported acceptance of Mr. Schultz's offer?
5.

(Transcript at page 55).

Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in dismissing this action?

(Record at page 1297).
6.

Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in denying Mr. Pett's and Mr.

Schultz's Rule 60 Motion?

(Record at page 1300-1357).

Standard of Review for Issues of Law:
Issues of law are subject to de novo review by an appellate court, and the court
gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v.
State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989).
VI
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES. RULES. AND OTHER AUTHORITIES
Statutes:
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-l 19
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-122
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-125
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-126
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-131
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, §48-2b-135
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Rules:
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 301
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1004

VII
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE
(A)
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision by Judge Brian of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, permitting Steve Evans and other members of his family
who claim to be members and managers to dismiss the complaint filed by Sure-Tech
against the Defendants. The order permitting Evans to dismiss the case was entered
over the objection of Robert Pett and Charles Schultz the only members and
managers of Sure-Tech. The order was entered based on perjured testimony by
Steve Evans claiming that Mr. Schultz offered to convey his and Mr. Pett's interest in
Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others, and Evans perjured testimony that he never
received any letters from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer.
(B)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL COURT LEVEL
Sure-Tech filed a complaint in this matter on April 4, 1994, seeking a
dissolution of EML. Charles Schultz represented Sure-Tech in the law suit. Ccdlister
Nebeker and McCullough (hereinafter, "Ccdlister") represented the Defendants in the
law suit. Various motions were filed in the case and some discovery was attempted.
On or about May 3, 1994, Ccdlister filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr. Schultz as
counsel for Sure-Tech, claiming that Mr. Schultz had represented Sure-Tech in the
past on the same issue. On May 20, 1994, Sure-Tech filed a Motion to Disqualify
6

Ccdlister, asserting that Callister, as corporate counsel for EML, could not represent
EML against Sure-Tech, a limited partner, in the dissolution proceeding. Both motions
were eventually heard in November 1994, and both Mr. Schultz and Callister were
disqualified from the case.
On or about April 21, 1995, Scott Daniels (hereinafter, "Daniels"), purporting to
act on behalf of Sure-Tech, signed a Stipulation for Dismissal of the case. On or
about April 24, 1995, Daniels filed an appearance in the case claiming to represent
Sure-Tech. Richard Nebeker entered an appearance for EML on or about April 24,
1995. On April 26, 1995, Mr. Schultz wrote to Judge Brian informing him that Daniels
did not represent Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent Sure-Tech
in this case. Daniels then requested a hearing to determine who had authority to
represent Sure-Tech.
A "Motion Hearing" was scheduled for one half hour on May 30, 1995, at 9:00
a.m. on Daniels' request. At that hearing, in contrast to the Notice from the trial court,
evidence was taken and witnesses testified.
At the hearing Steve Evans testified and falsely claimed he and his family
members were owners of Sure-Tech. Steve Evans also falsely claimed that he had
never received any letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey ownership
of Sure-Tech to Evans.
Mr. Schultz testified at the May 30, 1995 hearing, stating that the only members
of Sure-Tech were himself and Mr. Pett. Mr. Schultz also testified that he had sent
Evans a letter revoking any offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, but
informed the tried court that he did not have a copy of the letter at the hearing because
he thought, based on the court's notice, that the hearing was a motion hearing not an
evidentiary hearing. Mr. Schultz further testified that neither Evans nor any of his
family had ever owned any interest in Sure-Tech and therefore, had no authority to act
on behalf of Sure-Tech.
At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court received into evidence the Articles of
Organization of Sure-Tech, the Annual Reports for Sure-Tech and the Operating
7

Agreement of Sure-Tech, showing that Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were the only
members and managers of Sure-Tech.
The issue of whether or not a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans had been sent became of concern to the tried court,
and Mr. Guyon asked the court for a few minutes to send someone to get a copy of the
letter, but the court refused Mr. Guyon's request. Nonetheless, someone was sent to
get a copy of the letter revoking the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans,
but he did not arrive with the letter until five minutes after the hearing had concluded.
Mr. Guyon, who represented Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz at the hearing, attempted
to call Lisa Spivey to testify that a certified letter was sent to Steve Evans revoking the
offer to convey Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but
Judge Brian refused to let her testify. Mr. Guyon then proffered her testimony to the
court, stating that she had personally mailed a letter revoking the offer to convey Mr.
Pett and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others.
Based on Evans' perjured testimony and based on his mistaken belief that
Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to
Evans, Judge Brian erroneously concluded that Daniels had authority to represent
Sure-Tech and that he had authority to sign a stipulation dismissing the case.
Therefore, Judge Brian signed the Order of Dismissal on May 30, 1995. Although the
Order of Dismissal was signed on May 30, 1995, the Order was not entered into the
computer until June 28, 1995, and was not placed in the file until July 1995.
On May 30, 1995, immediately after the hearing, Mr. Guyon wrote Judge Brian a
letter and included a copy of one of Mr. Schultz's letters of revocation to Evans.
Another letter sent certified mail to Evans was presented to the Court at a later date.
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had planned to file a motion under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 59"), but because the Order of Dismissal
was signed and stamped filed May 30, 1995, and Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz did not
learn that the Order had been signed and stamped filed until June 28, 1995, they could
not file a motion under Rule 59. Therefore, on June 28, 1995, they filed a Motion under
8

Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 60"). In their Rule 60
Motion, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided documentation proving that Steve Evans
lied under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing. They also provided documentation
proving that only Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were ever the owners of Sure-Tech.
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1995, and on
August 9, 1995, Judge Brain signed a "Court Ruling" denying Mr. Pett's and Mr.
Schultz's Rule 60 Motion.
(C)
DISPOSITION OF CASE AT TRIAL COURT
Sure-Tech's Complaint against the Defendants was dismissed after a "motion"
hearing turned evidentiary hearing, in which Steve Evans committed perjury and
claimed that he never received any letters from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his offer to
convey Mr. Pett's and his own ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. Mr.
Pett and Mr. Schultz then appealed to the Supreme Court which in turn assigned the
case to this Court.
(D)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Sure-Tech L.L.C., (hereinafter, "Sure-Tech") was formed on February 14,

1993, by Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. (Record at pages 1312-1314)
2. The only members of Sure-Tech are Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz.
See the Affidavits of Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz. (Record at pages 13081311, 1336-1338) See also the Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech (Record at page
1316-1331); the 1993 Annual Report for Sure-Tech (Record at page 1332); a copy of the
1994 Annual Report for Sure-Tech (Record at page 1334); the Minutes of the Initial
Meeting of Sure-Tech (Record at page 1315); the Minutes of the First Annual Meeting
of Sure-Tech (Record at page 1333); and the Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting of
Sure-Tech (Record at page 1335).
3.

Sure-Tech a twenty percent (20%) limited partner of EML Projects LTD,

(hereinafter, "EML"), filed a complaint in this matter on April 11, 1994, seeking a
9

dissolution of EML (Record at page 2).
4.

Charles Schultz represented Sure-Tech in the law suit. Callister

represented the Defendants in the law suit. (Record at pages 2, 90).
5.

Various motions were filed in the case and some discovery was

attempted. (Record at page 300)
6.

On or about May 3, 1994, Callister filed a Motion to Disqualify Mr.

Schultz as counsel for Sure-Tech, claiming that Mr. Schultz had represented SureTech in the past on the same issue. (Record at page 96)
7.

On May 20, 1994, Sure-Tech filed a Motion to Disqualify Callister,

asserting that Callister, as corporate counsel for EML, could not represent EML
against Sure-Tech, a limited partner, in the dissolution proceeding. (Record at page
1263A).
8.

Both motions were eventually heard in November 1994, and both Mr.

Schultz and Callister were disqualified from the case. (Record at page 1174)
9.

Purporting to act on behalf of Sure-Tech, Scott Daniels (hereinafter,

"Daniels") signed a Stipulation for Dismissal of the case on or about April 21, 1995.
(Record at page 1252).
10.

On or about April 24, 1995, Daniels filed an appearance in the case

claiming to represent Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1256)
11.

Richard Nebeker entered an appearance for EML on or about April 24,

1995. (Record at page 1254).
12.

Mr. Schultz wrote to Judge Brian on April 26, 1995, informing him that

Daniels did not represent Sure-Tech and that Daniels had no authority to represent
Sure-Tech in this case. (Record at page 1258).
13.

Daniels then requested a hearing to determine who had authority to

represent Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1261).
14.

A "Motion Hearing" was scheduled for one half hour on May 30, 1995, at

9:00 a.m. on Daniels's request. (Record at page 1290).
15.

At that hearing, in contrast to the Notice from the tried court, evidence
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was taken and witnesses testified. (Transcript at pages 2-71).
16.

At the hearing Steve Evans testified and falsely claimed he and his

family members were owners of Sure-Tech. (Transcript at pages 3-6, 8).
17.

At the hearing Steve Evans claimed that Mr. Schultz had sent Evans a

letter offering to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's ownership of Sure-Tech to the
Evanses. (Transcript at page 11).
18.

Steve Evans also falsely claimed that he had never received any letter

from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans.
(Transcript at page 29)
19.

Mr. Schultz testified at the May 30, 1995 hearing, stating that the only

members of Sure-Tech were himself and Mr. Pett. (Transcript at page 57)
20.

Mr. Schultz also testified that he had sent Evans a letter revoking any

offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but informed the tried court that
he did not have a copy of the letter at the hearing because he thought, based on the
court's notice, that the hearing was a motion hearing not an evidentiary hearing.
(Transcript at pages 27, 59-60).
21.

In addition to the letter of November 22, 1994 letter, informing Evans that

Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz would not convey Sure-Tech to Evans, Mr. Schultz sent Evans
a letter dated December 22, 1994, wherein he again told Evans that Mr. Pett and Mr.
Schultz would not transfer ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or his family. Both letters
were sent certified mail. (Record at pages 1302, 1493).
22.

Mr. Schultz further testified thcrt neither Evans nor any of his family had

ever owned any interest in Sure-Tech. (Record at page 57, 60)
23.

At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court received into evidence the

Articles of Organization of Sure-Tech showing that Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were the
only members and managers of Sure-Tech. (Record at page 1298).
24.

At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the trial court also received into evidence

the Annual Reports for Sure-Tech showing thcrt the only members and managers of
Sure-Tech were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz. (Record at page 1298).
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25.

At the May 30, 1995 hearing, the tried court also received into evidence

the Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech stating that the only members of Sure-Tech
were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz. (Record at page 1298).
26.

Ed Guyon represented Mr. Pett, Mr. Schultz and Sure-Tech at the May

30, 1995 hearing. (Transcript at page 2).
27.

Daniels represented Steve Evans and Sure-Tech at the May 30, 1995

hearing. (Transcript at page 2)
28.

Mr. Guyon was only retained the morning of the hearing and only had 15

minutes to prepare for the hearing. (Record at page 1337).
29.

Mr. Schultz only learned of the hearing on May 26, 1995. (Record at

page 1336).
30.

The issue of whether or not a letter revoking Mr. Schultz's offer to convey

ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans had been sent became of concern to the trial court,
and Mr. Guyon asked the court for a few minutes to send someone to get a copy of the
letter, but the court refused Mr. Guyon's request. Nonetheless, someone was sent to
get a copy of the letter revoking the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans,
but he did not arrive with the letter until five minutes after the hearing had concluded.
(Transcript at page 50)
31.

Mr. Guyon attempted to call Lisa Spivey to testify that a certified letter

was sent to Steve Evans revoking the offer to convey Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's
ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses, but Judge Brian refused to let her testify.
(Transcript at page 55)
32.

Mr. Guyon then proffered her testimony to the court, stating that she had

personally mailed a letter revoking the offer to convey Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's
ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses. (Transcript at page 56)
33.

Based on Evans' perjured testimony and based on his mistaken belief

that Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech
to Evans, Judge Brian erroneously concluded that Daniels had authority to represent
Sure-Tech and that he had authority to sign a stipulation dismissing the case.
12

Therefore, Judge Brian signed the Order of Dismissal on May 30, 1995. Although the
Order of Dismissal was signed on May 30, 1995, the Order was not entered into the
computer until June 28, 1995, and was not placed in the file until July 1995. (Record at
page 1297).
34.

Daniels was then instructed by Judge Brian to prepare detailed findings

and conclusions of the May 30, 1995 hearing and to submit them to the court by June
9, 1995. However, Daniels never submitted any findings or conclusions to the court,
although he did prepare some proposed findings and conclusions which were
objected to by Mr. Guyon. (Record at page 1296).
35.

On May 30, 1995, immediately after the hearing, Mr. Guyon wrote Judge

Brian a letter and included a copy of one of Mr. Schultz's letters of revocation to
Evans. (Record at pages 1299-1304).
36.

Daniels latter admitted that he had in his possession at the May 30, 1995

hearing one of the letters to Evans withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others. (Record at page 1305).
37.

On June 28, 1995, Judge Noel signed an order extending the time for Mr.

Pett and Mr. Schultz to appeal the dismissal of this case until July 30, 1995. (Record at
page 1381-1382).
38.

Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had planned to file a motion under of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 59"), but because the Order of Dismissal
was signed and stamped filed May 30, 1995, and Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz did not
learn that the Order had been signed and stamped filed until June 28, 1995, they could
not file a motion under Rule 59. Therefore, on June 28, 1995, they filed a Motion under
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter, "Rule 60"). (Record at page
1368).
39.

In their Rule 60 Motion, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided documentation

proving that Steve Evans lied under oath at the May 30, 1995 hearing. They also
provided documentation proving that only Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz were ever the
owners of Sure-Tech. (Record at pages 1300-1357).
13

40.

Evans and Daniels never opposed Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60

Motion. (Record at page 1389-1390).
41.

Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed their Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1995.

(Record at page 1404-1405).
42.

On August 9, 1995, Judge Brain signed a "Court Ruling" denying Mr. Pett's

and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 Motion. (Record at page 1427).
43.

On August 29, 1996, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz filed an Amended Notice of

Appeal. (Record at page 1434).
* The transcript of the May 30,1995 hearing was not paginated at the time this
brief was prepared.

VIII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The tried court erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law when it
concluded that Evans and/or his then counsel of record had authority to dismiss the
complaint in this matter. The trial court erred as a matter of fact in concluding that
Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evans and/or others was
not withdrawn. The trial court further erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of
law in not allowing Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz time to obtain the letters sent to Evans
withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The
tried court also erred as a matter of law in not permitting Ms. Spivey to testify that
letters had been sent to Evans withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of
Sure-Tech to Evans.
The tried court again erred as a matter of law in denying Mr. Pett's and Mr.
Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion after Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz provided the court with
proof that Mr. Schultz had sent letters to Evans withdrawing his offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others, and that Evans lied at the May 30, 1995
hearing.

14

IX
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER
OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT EVANS, AND/OR HIS THEN ATTORNEY
DANIELS, HAD AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THIS CASE. THE TRIAL COURT
FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DENYING MR. PETT'S AND MR.
SCHULTZ'S RULE 60 (b) MOTION
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BOTH AS A MATTER OF FACT AND AS A MATTER LAW
WHEN IT BASED ITS DECISION TO PERMIT EVANS TO DISMISS THIS ACTION ON
EVANS PERJURED TESTIMONY.
The indisputable facts of this case prove thcrt Evans lied under oath when he
claimed that he never received any letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing the offer from
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others.
(Record crt pages 1336-1340, 1491). Evans was sent not only one letter withdrawing
the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, but two letters. (Record at pages
1302, 1491). The trial court improperly and unreasonably ignored Mr. Schultz's
testimony that the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The
trial court also improperly and unreasonably relied on Evans' perjured testimony that
he had never received any letters withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of SureTech. The trial court's conclusion was clearly erroneous. The trial court also
improperly and unreasonably precluded Mr. Schultz from obtaining the letters
proving that Evans was lying crt the hearing. The hearing was scheduled for a
"motion" hearing not a evidentiary hearing. The decision not to allow Mr. Schultz to
obtain copies of the letters sent to Evans was likewise clearly improper and
erroneous.
It is not surprising that Evans perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing.
Evans has a history of lying. He was fired by EML one of the Defendants in this case
for "Dishonesty" (Record crt pages 1355-1357) and was scheduled for a perjury hearing
before Judge Frederick in another case but avoided the hearing when the case was
dismissed. (Record at page 1375).
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Because the undisputable and irrefutable evidence proves that Evans, a
pathological liar, perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing, the trial court
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it chose to ignore Mr. Schultz's
testimony that Evans had been sent letters withdrawing the offer to convey Sure-Tech.
Therefore, this Court must reverse the tried court's decision and direct the tried court to
enter a ruling declaring that no one other than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz have or ever
had any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE EVANSES NEVER HAD ANY OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN SURE-TECH
AND BECAUSE MR. PETT AND MR. SCHULTZ NEVER CONVEYED ANY OWNERSHIP
OF SURE-TECH TO THE EVANS AND/OR OTHERS, THE EVANSES NEVER HAD ANY
AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF SURE-TECH AND TO DISMISS THIS CASE.
It is an indisputable fact that neither Evans nor any member of his family ever
had any ownership interest in Sure-Tech. The indisputable evidence is that only Mr.
Pett and Mr. Schultz were and are the owners of Sure-Tech. Because, only Mr. Pett
and Mr. Schultz were and are the only members and/or managers of Sure-Tech,
neither Evans nor any member of his family or extended family has or had any
authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and to dismiss this case. No one other than
Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had or have authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech.
Under express and controlling Utah law members may only be added to a
limited liability company in accordance with the articles of organization, the
operating agreement and/or the Utah Code. Utah Code §48-2b-122 specifies that new
members may only be added to an LLC in accordance with the terms of the operating
agreement if the operating agreement contains a provision for adding new members.
If the operating agreement does not contain a provision for adding new members,
then new members may only be added with the written consent of all members of the
LLC.
The Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech specifies that new members may only
b e added with the written consent of all members of Sure-Tech. (Record at page
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1328, Article 12.3). Because Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz never signed any written
document agreeing to add the Evanses or anyone else as members of Sure-Tech,
under clear and controlling Utah law, the Evanses cannot claim that they ever were
members of Sure-Tech or ever had any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. The
Operating Agreement of Sure-Tech was signed after the Articles of Organization were
filed. The Evanses are not listed as members or managers of Sure-Tech in the
Articles of Organization, and the Evanses are not listed as members or managers in
the Operating Agreement of Sue-Tech. (Record at pages 1312-1314,1316-1331).
Therefore, under clear and controlling Utah law, the Evanses never had any
ownership interest in Sure-Tech or any authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech.
Even if Evans had testified truthfully, and Mr. Schultz had not withdrawn his
offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others he designated, neither
Evans nor any other member of his family had any authority to act on behalf of SureTech. Assuming arguendo that Evans had timely accepted Mr. Schultz's offer to
convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans, it is still an undisputed fact that Mr. Schultz
and Mr. Pett never conveyed their ownership of Sure-Tech to the Evanses. (Transcript
at page 12). Therefore, if the Evanses wished to hold Mr. Schultz to his offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to them, they had to file suit to force Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz
to convey their ownership of Sure-Tech to them. They failed to do so and, therefore,
had no authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and to dismiss this case.
The fact that the Evanses never had any ownership of Sure-Tech is further
demonstrated in their letter of November 16, 1994 from Fred Evans and Beatrice Evans
to P. Bryan Fishbum. (Record at page 1345) In that letter, signed by both Fred Evans
and Beatrice Evans, both state that they are not permitted to "speak for Sure-Tech but
have talked to Charles Schultz and he has assured us he will go along with our
suggested offer." Both Mr. and Mrs. Evans then state in paragraph 3 of the letter that:
"Sure-Tech, Charles Schultz and Robert Pett shall be paid $50,000 dollars in return,
will return their 20% interest in EMLP." (Emphasis added). If Evans claimed at the
May 30, 1995 hearing that his mother and his father were members of Sure-Tech and
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had the controlling interest in Sure-Tech, why did Mr. and Mrs. Evans need Mr. Pett
and Mr. Schultz to "go along with" their suggested offer? Why did the Evanses not
simply make the offer on their own if they owned and controlled Sure-Tech? If the
Evanses owned any part of Sure-Tech, as Evans falsely claimed at the May 30, 1995
hearing, why were Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz to be paid $50,000.00 for their 20% interest
in Sure-Tech? How much were the Evanses to be paid for their alleged interest in
Sure-Tech? If Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz owned 20% of EMLP, how could the Evanses
claim to own any of Sure-Tech when Sure-Tech only owned 20% of EMLP and all of
that 20% was owned by Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz?
The tried court erred both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law when it
concluded thcrt Evans and/or anyone other than Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz had authority
to act on behalf of Sure-Tech. That err was prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, the
trial court's order dismissing this case must be reversed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT ALLOWING MR.
SCHULTZ TIME TO GET THE LETTERS SENT TO EVANS PROVING THAT MR.
SCHULTZ HAD WITHDRAWN HIS OFFER TO CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF SURE-TECH
TO EVANS OR OTHERS.
The May 30, 1995 hearing was scheduled as a "motion" hearing. (Record at
page 1290). Mr. Schultz only received notice of the hearing on May 26, 1994. (Record
at page 1337). Mr. Guyon only learned of the hearing on Monday, May 30, 1995
approximcrtely 15 minutes prior to the hearing. (Record at page 1336-1337).
Beccmse neither Mr. Guyon nor Mr. Schultz had any notice that the hearing
was an evidentiary hearing rather than a motion hearing, as the Notice of Hearing
stated, Mr. Schultz did not have all of the relevant documents with him crt the hearing.
When Evans committed perjury, clciiming that he never received any letter from Mr.
Schultz withdrawing the offer to convey to Evans the ownership of Sure-Tech, Mr.
Guyon and Mr. Schultz recjuested time to get the letters proving that the offer had
been withdrcrwn, the tried court improperly denied Mr. Guyon and Mr. Schultz' request,
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even though it would have only taken twenty minutes to get the letters. (Transcript at
pages 49, 60). The denial of Mr. Guyon's and Mr. Schultz's request for twenty to thirty
minutes to obtain copies of the letters sent to Evans withdrawing the offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others was clearly an abuse of the trial
court's discretion, given the fact that the hearing was scheduled for a motion hearing
rather than an evidentiary hearing. That denial was prejudicial and reversible and,
therefore, the trial court's order permitting Evans to dismiss this action must be
reversed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
PRECLUDED MS. SPIVEY FROM TESTIFYING THAT SHE HAD PERSONALLY
PLACED IN THE UNITED STATES MAIL A LETTER TO EVANS WITHDRAWING THE
OFFER FROM MR. SCHULTZ CONVEYING OWNERSHIP OF SURE-TECH TO EVANS
OR OTHERS.
In a remarkable abuse of discretion, the trial court precluded Ms. Spivey, Mr.
Schultz's para-legal, from testifying that she had personally placed in the United
States mail a letter to Evans from Mr. Schultz withdrawing Mr. Schultz's previous offer
to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others. The trial court precluded
Ms. Spivey^ testimony based on a best evidence objection, Utah Rules of Evidence,
Rule 1004. The best evidence rule does not preclude a person from testifying that the
person mailed the document. It may preclude a person from testifying as to the
contents of the document, unless the whereabouts of the original is explained, but it
does not preclude a person from testifying that a document was mailed to an
individual. The trial court's ruling precluding Ms. Spivey from testifying that she had
sent a letter to Evans from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his previous offer to convey
ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others, was a clear abuse of discretion and,
therefore, must be reversed.
The tried court's ruling precluding Ms. Spivey's testimony is even a more
egregious breach of discretion because Evans attorney, Daniels, later admitted that
he had one of the letters Evans swore under oath he never received, in his file at the
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May 30, 1995 hearing. (Record at page 1305).
The tried courts refusal to permit Ms. Spivey to testify that she personally mailed
to Evans a letter from Mr. Schultz withdrawing his offer to convey ownership of SureTech to Evans and/or others was prejudicial and reversible error. Therefore, the trial
court's order of dismissal must be reversed.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DENIED MR. PETT'S AND MR. SCHULTZ'S RULE 60(b) MOTION.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court did not error in its initial ruling at
the May 30, 1995 hearing, it committed prejudicial and reversible error when it denied
Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 (b) Motion. In their Rule 60(b) Motion Mr. Pett and
Mr. Schultz provided the tried court with irrefutable proof that Mr. Schultz had sent
Evans a letter withdrawing the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans.
(Record at pages 1306, 1336-1340). Not only was Evans sent one letter withdrawing
the offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech, he was sent two letters, and both letters
were sent before Evans attempted to accept Mr. Schultz's offer to convey ownership of
Sure-Tech to Evans and/or others, and both letters were sent certified mail. (Record
at pages 1339-1340, 1491).
Evans did not even oppose Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion, and
he did not attempt to contradict Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's proof that he had been
sent and received letters withdrawing Mr. Schultz's offer to convey Sure-Tech to Evans
and/or others. Evans did not attempt to do so because he could not do so. His
attorney had in his file at the May 30, 1995 hearing a copy of a letter from Mr. Schultz
withdrawing his offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or others specified
by Evans.
The trial court's denial of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60 (b) Motion was
clearly erroneous as a matter of fact, as Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz proved beyond any
doubt that Evans had perjured himself at the May 30, 1995 hearing and proved
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beyond any doubt that Mr. Schultz had withdrawn the offer to convey ownership of
Sure-Tech to Evans or others prior to the time Evans attempted to accept the offer.
The trial court's denial of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion was also
clearly erroneous because Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz proved beyond any doubt that
none of the Evanses were ever members of Sure-Tech and under Utah law had no
authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech.
The tried court's denied of Mr. Pett's and Mr. Schultz's Rule 60(b) Motion was
prejudicial and reversible. Therefore, this Court must reverse the tried court's order
dismissing this case and direct the tried court to enter an order declaring that only Mr.
Pett and Mr. Schultz have authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech and that only Mr.
Pett and Mr. Schultz have ever had authority to act on behalf of Sure-Tech.

X
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The clear and undisputable evidence is that none of the Evanses have, or have
ever had, any ownership interest in Sure-Tech. The undisputable evidence also
proves that Steve Evans perjured himself crt the May 30, 1995 hearing before Judge
Brian when he testified under oath that he never received any letters from Mr. Schultz
withdrawing Mr. Schultz's previous offer to convey ownership of Sure-Tech to Evans or
others.
The tried court committed prejudicial cmd reversible error when it permitted
Evans and/or his then counsel of record, Scott Daniels, to dismiss this matter. The
trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error when it precluded Ms.
Spivey from testifying crt the May 30, 1995 hearing in this matter. The trial court further
committed prejudicial and reversible error when it denied Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz's
Rule 60(b) Motion.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz respectfully request that this Court
reverse the tried court's decision permitting Evans and/or Daniels to dismiss this case
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and enter instructions to the tried court to enter an order declaring that the Evanses do
not no have, or have ever had, any ownership interest in Sure-Tech.
Dated this <~s day of January 1997.

Charles A. Schultz
Attorney for Robert J. Pett and Pro Se
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Order of Dismissal
June 7, 1995 letter from Scott Daniels to Edwin Guyon
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Amended Notice of Appeal
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389
CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Action
78-2-1.

Number of justices — Terras — Chief justice and
associate chief justice — Selection and functions.
TS-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.
73-2-2.
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
75-2-3.
Repealed.
75-2-4.
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tempore, and practice of law.
78-2-5.
Repealed.
75-2-6.
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7.
Repealed.
78-2-7.5.
Service of sheriff to court.
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.

78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice
and associate chief justice — Selection and
functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices.
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed
initially to serve until the first general election held more than
diree years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten
years and commences on the first Monday in January following the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is
appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief
justice from among the members of the court by a majority
vote of all justices. The term of the office of chief justice is four
years. The chief justice may serve successive terms. The chief
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice may be
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court.
(4 J If the justices are unable to elect a chiefjustice within 30
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section. If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by
law.
(6) There is created t h e office of associate chief justice. The
term of office of t h e associate chief justice is two years. The
associate chief justice may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n
too successive t e r m s . The associate chief justice shall be
elected by a majority vote of the m e m b e r s of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deterg e s . If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice.
The chief justice m a y delegate responsibilities to t h e associate
^ i e f justice as consistent with law.
1990
7

8-2-1.5,78-2-1.6.

'8-2-2.

Repealed.

1971,1981

Supreme Court j u r i s d i c t i o n .

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
^traordinary writs and authority to issue all writs ana
Process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
^ d decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
13) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
Jurisdiction of interlocutor}-' appeals, o\ er.

78-2-4

(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Sovereign Lands and Forestry;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
of a first degree or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has
original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a
capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a)
through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under
Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative
proceedings.
1995
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4.

S u p r e m e Court — R u l e m a k i n g , j u d g e s p r o tempore, a n d p r a c t i c e of law.

(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution,
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties.
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States,
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah.
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(b) an attorney granted the authority to practice law by
the Supreme Court of the state of Utah as provided in
Title 78, Chapter 51;
(c) a chiropractor holding a license under Title 58,
Chapter 12, Part 7, Chiropractic Improvements Act, and
any subsequent laws regulating the practice of chiropractic;
(d) a doctor of dentistry holding a license under Title
58, Chapter 7, Dentists and Dental Hygienists Act, and
any subsequent laws regulating the practice of dentistry;
(e) a professional engineer registered under Title 58,
Chapter 22, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors
Licensing Act;
(f) a naturopath holding a license under Title 5S ;
Chapter 12, Part 3. and any subsequent laws regulating
the practice of naturopathy;
(g) a nurse whose professional nursing license designates him as a nurse anesthetist pursuant to Subsection
58-31-9.1(1):
(h) an optometrist holding a licen^f under Title 58,
Chapter 16a, and any subsequent "laws regulating the
practice of optometry"
(i) an osteopathic physician or surgeon holding a license under Title 58, Chapter 12, Pan 1, Osteopathic
Medicine Licensing Act, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of osteopathy;
(j) a pharmacist holding a license under Title 56,
Chapter 17, Pharmacy Practice Act, and any subsequent
laws regulating the practice of pharmacy;
(k) a physician, surgeon, or doctor of medicine holding
a license under Title 58, Chapter 12, Part 5, Medical
Practice Act, and any subsequent laws regulating the
practice of medicine;
(1) a physical therapist holding a license under Title 58,
Chapter 24a, Physical Therapy Practice Act, and any
subsequent laws regulating the practice of physical therapy,
(m) a podiatrist holding a license under Title 58, Chapter 5, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of
chiropody;
(n) a psychologist holding a license under Title 58,
Chapter 25a, Psychologists Licensing Act, and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of psychology;
(o) a public accountant holding a license under Title 58,
Chapter 26, Certified Public Accountant Licensing Act,
and any subsequent laws regulating the practice of public
accounting;
(p) a real estate broker or real estate agent holding a
license under Title 61, Chapter 2, and any subsequent
laws regulating the sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or
leasing of real estate;
(q) a clinical or certified social worker holding a license
under Title 58, Chapter 35, and any subsequent laws
regulating the practice of social wrork; and
(r) a veterinarian holding a license under Title 58,
Chapter 28, Veterinary Practice Act, and any subsequent
laws regulating the practice of veterinary medicine.
(8) "Regulating board" means the board organized pursuant
to state law which is charged with the licensing and regulation
of the practice of the profession which a limited liability
company is organized to render.
(9) "State" means a state, territory, or possession of the
United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico.
(10) "Successor limited liability company' means the surviving or resulting limited liability company existing pursuant
to a merger or consolidation cf fvo or mrre limited liability
companies.
i«*2

48-2b-105

48-2b-103. Formation.
Two or more persons may form a limited liability company
by executing and delivering to the division articles of organization for the limited liability company. An interest of a
member in a limited liability company is personal property.
1991

48-2b-104. Scope.
Except as otherwise provided by the laws of this state, a
limited liability company may conduct or promote any lawful
business or purpose which a partnership, general corporation,
or professional corporation may conduct or promote.
i&9i
48-2b-105. Powers.
(1) Each limited liability company organized and existing
under this chapter may:
(a) sue or be sued, or institute or defend any action,
arbitration, or proceeding, whether judicial, administrative, or otherwise, in its own name;
(b) purchase, take, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire,
own, hold, improve, use, or otherwise deal in or with real
or personal property or an interest in real or personal
property, wherever situated;
(c) sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, create a security
interest inr iease. exchange or transfer, or otherwise
dispose of ali or any part of its property or assets;
(d) lend money to and otherwise assist its employees
and managers;
(e) purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise
acquire, own, hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend,
pledge, otherwise dispose of, or otherwise use or deal in or
with:
(i) shares or other interests in or obligations of
other foreign or domestic limited liability companies,
domestic or foreign corporations, associations, general or limited partnerships, or individuals; or
(ii) direct or indirect obligations of the United
States or any other government, state, territory,
governmental district, or municipality or of any instrumentality of them;
(f) make contracts or guarantees or incur liabilities,
borrow money at such rates of interest as the limited
liability company may determine, issue its notes, bonds,
or other obligations, or secure any of its obligations by
mortgage or pledge of all or any part of its property,
franchises, and income;
(g) lend money for any lawful purpose, invest or reinvest its funds, or take and hold real or personal property
as security for the payment of funds so loaned or invested;
(h) conduct its business and maintain offices and exercise the powers granted by this chapter within or without
this state, in any state, territory, district, or possession of
the United States or in any foreign country;
(i) elect or appoint managers and agents of the limited
liability company, define their duties, and fix their compensation;
(j) make end alter an operating agreement, not inconsistent with its articles of organization or with the laws of
this state, for the administration and regulation of its
affairs;
(k) make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, ieligious, or educational purposes;
(1) indemnify a member or manager or any other person to the same extent that a partnership may indemnify
any of the partners, managers, employees, or agents of the
partnership against expenses actually and reasonably
incurred by the member or manager in connection with
the defense of an action, suit, or proceeding, whstner civil
or cr:rr.:nal, ir. wr.::h the member or manager is made a
psrty:
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(m) cease its activities and surrender its certificate of
organization;
(n) have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect any or all of the purposes for which the
company is organized;
(o) transact any lawful business which the members or
the managers find to be in aid of governmental policy;
(p) pay pensions and establish pension plans, profitsharing plans, and other incentive plans for any or all of
its managers and employees;
(q) be a promoter, incorporator, general partner, limited partner, member, associate, or manager of any corporation, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
company, joint venture, trust, or other enterprise; and
(r) render professional services, if each member of a
limited liability company who renders professional services in Utah is licensed or registered to render those
professional sen-ices p u r s u a n t to applicable U t a h law.
(2) A limited liability company organized to render professional services under this chapter may render only one specific
type of professional services, and services ancillary to them,
and may not engage in any business other t h a n rendering the
professional services which it was organized to render, and
services ancillary to them.
(3) A limited liability company organized to render professional services:
(a) may include members, managers, and employees
authorized under the laws of the jurisdiction where they
reside to provide similar services;
(b) may render professional services in U t a h only
through its members, managers, and employees who are
licensed or registered by the s t a t e of Utah to r e n d e r those
professional services; and
(c) shall have all of the other powers provided under
this section.
1991
48-2b-106. N a m e — E x c l u s i v e r i g h t
(1) The n a m e of each limited liability company as set forth
in the articles of organization:
(a) shall contain the words "limited company,'' "limited
liability company," "L.C.," or "L.L.C.";
(b) m a y not contain the words "association," "corporation," "incorporated," "limited partnership," "limited,"
"L.P.," "Ltd.," or words or any abbreviation with a similar
meaning in any other language; and
(c) may not, without the written consent of t h e United
States Olympic Committee, contain the words "Olympic,"
"Olympiad," or "Citius Altius Fortius."
(2) (a) A person or entity, other than a limited liability
company formed or registered under this chapter, m a y not
use any of the terms "limited liability company," "limited
company," "L.L.C.," "L.C.," "LLC," or "LC" in its n a m e in
this state, except t h a t any foreign corporation whose
actual name includes the word "limited" or "Ltd." m a y use
its actual name in this state if "corporation," "incorporated," or any abbreviation of these is also used.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a limited liability partnership may use the t e r m s "limited liability partnership," "L.L.P.," or a LLP" in its name.
(3) Except as authorized by Subsection (4), the n a m e of a
limited liability company must be distinguishable as defined
in Subsection (5) upon the records of the division from:
(a) the name of any limited partnership formed or
authorized to transact business in this state;
(b) t h e name of any limited liability company formed or
authorized to transact business in this state;
(c) the corporate name of any corporation incorporated
or authorized to transact business in the state;
(d) any limited partnership n a m e reserved under this
chapter;
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(e) a n y limited liability company name reserved under
this chapter;
(f) any corporate n a m e reserved under Title 16, Chat>.
ter 10a, Utah Revised Business Corporation Act a*
amended, or Title 16, C h a p t e r 6, Utah Nonprofit Corporation and Cooperative Association Act, as amended*
(g) any fictitious name adopted by a foreign corporation, limited partnership, or limited liability company
authorized to transact business in this state because its
real n a m e is unavailable;
(h) any corporate name of a not-for-profit corporation
incorporated or authorized to transact business in this
state; and
(i) any assumed name, trademark, or service mark
registered by the division.
(4) A limited liability company may apply to the division for
approval to file its articles of organization under or to reserve
a name t h a t is not distinguishable upon the division's records
from one or more of the names described in Subsection (3). The
division shall approve the n a m e for which the company
applies if:
(a) the other person whose name is not distinguishable
from the n a m e under which the applicant desires to file
consents to the filing in writing and submits an undertaking in a form satisfactory to the division to change its
name to a n a m e that is distinguishable from the name of
the applicant; or
(b) the applicant delivers to t h e division a certified copy
of the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction
establishing the applicant's right to use the name in this
state.
(5) A n a m e is distinguishable from other names, tradem a r k s , and service m a r k s registered with the division if it
contains one or more different letters or numerals from other
names upon t h e division's records. Differences between singular and plural forms of words a r e distinguishing.
(6) The following differences are not distinguishing:
(a) the words "corporation," "incorporated," "company,"
'limited partnership," "limited," "L.P.," "Ltd.," "limited
liabilitj' company," "limited company," "L.C.," "L.L.C.," or
any abbreviation of these words;
(b) the presence or absence of the words or symbols of
the words "the," "and," "a," or "plus";
(c) differences in punctuation and special characters; or
(d) differences in capitalization.
(7) The director of the division shall have the power and
authority reasonably necessary to interpret and efficiently
administer this section and to perform the duties imposed
upon the division by this section.
(8) A name t h a t implies t h a t a limited liability company is
an agency of this s t a t e or any of its political subdivisions, if it
is not actually such a legally established agency or subdivision, may not be approved for filing by the division.
(9) The exclusive right to a n a m e may be reserved by:
(a) any person intending to organize a limited liability
company u n d e r this chapter and to adopt t h a t name;
(b) any limited liability company or any foreign limited
liability company registered in this state intending to
adopt t h a t n a m e ;
(c) any foreign limited liability company intending to
register in this state and intending to adopt t h a t name;
and
(d) any person intending to organize a foreign limited
liability company and intending to have it register in this
state and adopt that name.
(10; The reservation shall be m a d e by filing with the
division an application executed u n d e r penalty of penury by
the applicant to reserve a snec-ficd name. If tne division find?
that the name is available for use by a limited liability
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(c) the business purpose or purposes for which the
limited liability compan3r is organized;
(d) the street address of its registered office in the state
and the name, street address, and signature of its initial
registered agent in the state;
(e) a statement that the division is appointed the agent
of the limited liability company for service of process if the
agent has resigned, the agent's authority has been revoked, or the agent cannot be found or served with the
exercise of reasonable diligence;
(f) if the limited liability company is to be managed by
a manager or managers, a statement that the company is
to be managed in that fashion and the names and street
addresses of the managers who are to serve until the first
meeting of members or until their successors are elected;
(g) if the management of a limited liability company is
reserved to the members, the names and street addresses
of the members; and
vh i any other provision, not inconsistent with law, that
the members choose to include in the articles of organization for the regulation of the internal affairs of the
limited liability company, including any provision that is
required or permitted to be included in the operating
agreement of the limited liability company under this
chapter.
(2) It is not necessary to include in the articles of organization any of the powers enumerated in this chapter.
1992
4S-2b-117. F i l i n g of a r t i c l e s .
(1) An original and one copy of the articles of organization
and of any certificates of amendment, or of any judicial decree
of amendment, shall be delivered to the division. A person who
executes a certificate of amendment as an attorney-in-fact or
fiduciary need not exhibit evidence of his authority as a
prerequisite to filing. Unless it finds that the articles of
organization do not conform to law as to their form, the
division, upon receipt of all filing fees established under
Section 63-38-3.2, shall:
(a) place a stamp or seal on the original and the copy,
indicating the time, day, month, and year of the filing, the
name of the division, the signature of the division director,
and the division's seal, or facsimiles of them;
(b) file the signed original in its office; and
(c) return the stamped copy to the person who filed it or
as directed by the person who filed it.
(2) Upon the filing with the division of a certificate of
amendment, the articles of organization shall be amended as
set forth in the certificate of amendment, and upon the
effective date of a certificate of dissolution or of a judicial
decree of cancellation, the articles of organization shall be
canceled.
1996
48-2b-118. Effect of filing — Prefiling a c t i v i t i e s .
(1) Upon the placement of a stamp or seal, as provided in
Subsection 48~2b-117(l)(a), on the articles of organization, the
limited liability company shall be considered organized.
(2) Except as against the state of Utah in a proceeding to
cancel or revoke the certificate of organization or in a proceeding for involuntary dissolution of the limited liability company,
the filed articles shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions precedent required to be performed by the members have
been complied with and that the limited liability company has
been legally organized under this chapter.
(3) A limited liability company may not transact business or
incur indebtedness, except that which is incidental to its
organization or to obtaining subscriptions for or payment of
contributions, until the articles of organization have been filed
with the division. Persons engaged in prefiling activities other
than those authorized by this section shall be jointly and
severally liable for any debts cr liabilities incurred in the
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course of those activities. Nevertheless, this section may a^
be interpreted to invalidate any debts, contracts, or liabilities
of the limited liability company incurred on behalf of $%
limited liability company prior to the filing of its articles of
organization with the division.
199l
48-2b-119. R e c o r d s .
(1) Each limited liability company shall keep at its printf.
pal place of business the following:
(a) a current list in alphabetical order of the full name
and last known business street address of each member
(b) a copy of the stamped articles of organization and
all certificates of amendment to them, collectively referred to as the "certificate of organization," together with
executed copies of any powers of attorney pursuant to
which any certificate of amendment has been executed;
(c) copies of the limited liability company's federal,
state, and local income tax returns and reports, if any, for
the three most recent years;
(d) copies of any financial statements of the limited
liability company, if any, for the three most recent years;
(e) a copy of the limited liability company's operating
agreement, if any; and
(f) unless otherwise set forth in the articles of organization, a written statement setting forth:
(i) the amount of cash and a description and statement of the agreed value of the other property oi
services contributed and agreed to be contributed b)
each member;
(ii) the times at which, or events on the happening
of which, any additional contributions agreed to tx
made by each member are to be made;
(iii) any right of a member to receive distribution*
which include a return of all or any of the member*!
contributions; and
(iv) any event upon the happening of which th<
limited liability company is to be dissolved and it*
affairs wound up.
(2) Records kept under this section are subject to inspectio:
and copying at the reasonable request and at the expense o
any member during ordinary business hours. The divisior
may subpoena any of these records if a limited liability
company denies any member access to the records.
199!
48-2b-120. A n n u a l r e p o r t .
(1) Each limited liability company and each foreign limitec
liability company authorized to transact business in this 6tat*
shall file with the division, during the month of its anniver
sary date of formation, in the case of domestic limited liability
companies, or during the month of the anniversary date o
being granted authority to transact business in this state, ii
the case of foreign limited liability companies authorized U
transact business in this state, an annual report setting forth
(a) the name of the limited liability company and th<
state or country under the laws of which it is formed;
(b) the name and street address of the agent for servia
of process required to be maintained under Section 48-2b
123; and
(c) there is a change of the registered agent required U
be maintained by Section 48-2b-123.
(2) The annual report shall be made on forms prescribec
and furnished by the division, and the information containet
on the annual report shall be given as of the date of executioi
of the report The annual report forms shall include a state
ment notifying the limited liability company that failure to fil<
the annual report will result in the suspension and eventua
cancellation of its certificate of organization, in the case of i
domestic limited liability company, or of its registration, in tru
case of a foreign limiied liability company authorized t<
transact business i-. th;r bt-ate
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(3) The annual report shall be signed by any m e m b e r under
penalty of perjury. If the registered agent h a s changed since
the last a n n u a l report, the a n n u a l report shall also be signed
by the new registered agent.
(4) If the report conforms to the requirements of this
chapter, the division shall file the report. If the report does not
conform, the division shall mail the report first class postage
prepaid to the limited liability company a t the street address
set forth for its agent for sen-ice of process in the certificate of
organization or most recent report, for any necessary corrections. If a report is returned, the penalties for failure to file the
report within the time prescribed in this section do not apply,
as long as the report is corrected and returned to the division
within 30 days from the date the nonconforming report was
mailed to the limited liability company.
1991
48-2b-121. W h e n a m e n d m e n t s r e q u i r e d .
(1) The articles of organization of a limited liability company shall be amended when:
(a) there is a change in the name of the limited liability
company;
(b) there is a change in the character of the business of
the limited liability company specified in the articles of
organization;
(c) there is a false or erroneous s t a t e m e n t in the
articles of organization;
(d) there is a change in the time, as stated in the
articles of organization, for the dissolution of the limited
liability company;
(e) there is a change in the names and street addresses
of the managers of the limited liability company or, if t h e
limited liability company is managed by its m e m b e r s , the
names and street addresses of the members;
(f) t h e members determine to fix a time, not previously
specified in the articles of organization, for t h e dissolution
of the limited liability company; or
(g) t h e members desire to m a k e a change in a n y other
s t a t e m e n t in t h e articles of organization in order for the
articles to accurately represent the a g r e e m e n t among
them.
(2) Each limited liability company shall file with t h e division a copy of any a m e n d m e n t to the articles within 60 days
after the adoption of the amendment.
i9«2
48-2b-122. A d d i t i o n a l m e m b e r s .
After the filing of a limited liability company's original
articles of organization, additional members m a y be admitted
as provided in the operating agreement or, if t h e operating
agreement does not provide for t h e admission of additional
members, with the written consent of all m e m b e r s , except
that, notwithstanding any provision in the operating agreement, no additional member may be admitted without the
written consent of the members entitled to receive a majority
of the profits of the company
i9$i
48-2b-123. R e g i s t e r e d a g e n t .
(1) Each limited liability company shall continuously maintain an agent in this state for service cf process on the limited
liability company.
(2) This agent shall be 3n individual residing in this state,
a domestic corporation, a foreign corporation authorized to do
business in this state, or any member of t h e limited liability
company.
(3) Failure to maintain a registered agent in this s t a t e shall
be grounds for involuntary dissolution cf the limited liability
company by t h e division u n d e r Section 48-2b-142.
(4) The registered agent of a limited liability company may
resign by filing a n original and one copy of a signed written
notice of resignation with the division. The division shall then
mail a copy of the notice of resignation to the registered office
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of the limited liability company a t the street address set forth
in the limited liability company's articles of organization. The
appointment of the registered agent ends 30 days after the
division receives notice of the resignation.
1991
48-2b-124. C a p i t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
The contributions to capital of a member to the limited
liability company may consist of cash, property, services
rendered, or a promissory note or other binding obligation to
contribute cash or property or to perform services.
1991
48«2b-125. M a n a g e m e n t .
(1) The management of the limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization, shall be
vested in its members in proportion to their interests in the
profits of the limited liability company, as reflected in the
operating agreement and as adjusted from time to time to
properly reflect any additional contributions or withdrawals
by the members. If the management of the limited liability
company is vested in the members, any member has authority
to bind t h e limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization.
(2) If the articles of organization provide for the management of the limited liability company by a manager or managers, the m a n a g e r or managers shall be any person elected by
the members in the manner prescribed by and provided in the
operating agreement of the limited liability company. If the
management of the limited liability company is vested in a
manager or managers, any manager has authority to bind the
limited liability company, unless otherwise provided in the
articles of organization. A m a n a g e r shall serve for a term
specified in t h e operating agreement. This t e r m m a y not
exceed t h e duration of the limited liability company as specified in t h e articles of organization.
(3) The m a n a g e r or m a n a g e r s shall also hold the offices and
have the responsibilities accorded to t h e m by t h e m e m b e r s
and as provided for in the operating agreement of t h e limited
liability company.
1992
48-2b-126. O p e r a t i n g a g r e e m e n t s .
(1) An operating agreement may be adopted with the
unanimous consent of the members.
(2) An operating agreement may be altered, amended, or
repealed as provided in the operating agreement of the limited
liability company.
(3) The operating agreements may provide for t h e regulation and m a n a g e m e n t of the affairs of the limited liability
company in any m a n n e r not inconsistent with law or the
articles of organization.
(4) The operating agreement may also provide for the
removal of a manager or m a n a g e r s and for the termination of
a member's interest in the limited liability company. If a
member's interest in the limited liability company is terminated p u r s u a n t to the operating agreement, the m e m b e r may
rightfully demand a return of the member's contribution
pursuant to Section 48-2b-132.
1992
48*2b-127. O w n e r s h i p a n d d i s p o s i t i o n of property.
(1) Real or personal property owned or purchased by a
limited liability company may be held and owned, and conveyance shall be made, in t h e n a m e of the limited liability
company.
(2) I n s t r u m e n t s and documents providing for the acquisition, mortgage, or disposition of property of the limited liability company shall be valid and binding upon t h e limited
liability company if they are executed by one or more m a n a g ers of a limited liability company having a m a n a g e r or
managers or if they are executed by one or more members of a
limited liability company in which management h a s been
retained by the members.
\99i
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48-2b-128. Conditions for property distribution.
From time to time, the limited liability company may
distribute its property to the members of the limited liability
company upon the basis stipulated in the operating agreement
if, after distribution is made, the fair value of the assets of the
limited liability company is in excess of all liabilities of the
limited liability company except liabilities to members on
account of their contributions.
i»8i
48-2b-129. Assets distribution.
Distributions of cash or other assets of a limited liability
company shall be allocated among the members in the manner
provided in the operating agreement. If the operating agreement does not otherwise provide, cash or other assets shall be
allocated on the basis of value of the contributions made by
each member to the extent they have been received by the
limited liability company and have not been returned. Value of
the contributions made shall be determined as stated in the
artides of organization or the records of the limited liability
company as required by Section 48-2b-119.
1991
48-2b-130. Profits and losses.
The profits and losses of a limited liability company shall be
allocated among the members in the manner provided in the
operating agreement. If the operating agreement does not
otherwise provide, profits and losses shall be allocated on the
basis of value of the contributions made by each member to the
extent they have been received by the limited liability company and have not been returned. Value of the contributions
made shall be determined as stated in the articles of organization or the records of the limited liability company as
required by Section 48-2b-119.
1991
48-2b-131. Transfer, adjustment, and assignment of
member interests — Effect.
(1) An interest of a member in a limited liability company
may be adjusted, transferred, or assigned as provided in the
operating agreement. However, if the nontransferring members entitled to receive a majority of the non transferred profits
of the limited liability company, pursuant to Section 48-2b130, do not consent to the proposed transfer or assignment,
the transferee of the interest of the member has no right to
participate in the management of the business and affairs of
the limited liability company or to become a member. In that
event, the transferee is entitled to receive only the share of
profits or other compensation by way of income and the return
of contributions to which that member would otherwise be
entitled.
(2) A member of a limited liability company organized to
render professional services may voluntarily transfer his
shares in a limited liability company only to a person who is
licensed or registered by the jurisdiction in which the person
resides to render the same type of professional services as
those for which the company was organized. Any transfer of a
member's interest in a limited liability company in violation of
this section is void.
1991
48-2b-132. Conditions for distribution of property —
Return of contribution.
(1) A member shall receive no distribution of limited liability company property on account of any member's contribution
tc capital until:
(a) all liabilities of the limited liability company, except
liabilities to members on account of their contributions to
capital, have been paid or sufficient property of the
company remains to pay them; and
(b) the consent of all members is obtained, unless the
return of the contribution to capital may be rightfully
demanded as provided in this chapter, the articles of
organization, or the operating agreement.
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(2) Subject to Subsection (1), a member may rightfujh
demand the return of the member's contribution:
j
(a) upon the dissolution of the limited liability coi^
pany;
1
(b) when the date an event specified in the articles rf
organization for the return of the contribution has ai
rived; or
|
(c) after the member has given all other members of ti*
limited liability company six months' prior notice j[
writing, if no other time period is specified in the articles'
of organization for the dissolution of the limited liability
company.
(3) In the absence of a statement in the articles of organil
zation to the contrary or the consent of all members of the
limited liability company, a member, irrespective of the naturt
of the member's contribution, has only the right to demanc!
and receive cash in return for the member's contribution tcj
capital.

1991!

48-2b-133. Member liabilities.
j
(1) A member of a limited liability company is liable to the!
company:
(a) for the difference between the amount of the mem-l
ber's contributions to capital which have been actuall)|
made and the amount which is stated in the operating!
agreement or other contract as having been made; and I
(b) for any unpaid contribution to capital which thej
member, in the operating agreement or other contract,
agreed to make in the future at the time and on the
conditions stated in the operating agreement or other
!
contract.
(2) A member holds as trustee for the limited liability ]
company:
(a) specific property which is stated in the operating
agreement or other contract as having been contributed
by the member, if the property was not contributed or it
has been wrongfully or erroneously returned; and
(b) money or other property wrongfully paid or conveyed to the member on account of the member's contribution.
(3) The liabilities of a member as set out in this section may
be waived or compromised upon the consent of all other
members. This waiver or compromise does not affect the rights
of a creditor of the limited liability company who extended
credit or whose claim arose prior to the dissolution of the
limited liability company.
(4) When a member has rightfully received the return, in
whole or in part, of his or her capital contribution, the member
remains liable to the limited liability company for any sum,
not in excess of the return with interest, necessary to discharge the limited liability company's obligations to all creditors of the limited liability company who extended credit or
whose claims arose before the return.
i^ 1
48-2b-134. Execution of documents.
(1) Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, each certificate or report required by this chapter to be filed with the
division shall be executed in the following manner:
(a) articles of organization shall be signed by two
members or two managers;
(b) the certificate of amendment shall be signed under
penalty of perjury by at least one member, as authorized
pursuant to the operating agreement, and by each other
member designated in the certificate of amendment as a
new member;
(c) the annual repon shall be signed under penalty of
perjury by at least one member, as authorized pursuant to
the oper^tinp agreement, and, if the registered agent Uss
changed subsequent to the filing of the articles of crgani-
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zation or the last annual report, by the registered agent;
and
(d) articles of dissolution shall be signed under penalty
of perjury by at least one member, as authorized pursuant
to the operating agreement.
(2) Any person may sign any certificate or articles by an
attorney-in-fact, but a power of attorney to sign a certificate
relating to the admission of a member shall specify the
admission of the member. Powers of attorney relating to the
signing of a certificate by an attorney-in-fact need not be filed
with the division but shall be retained by the company.
(3) The execution of articles of organization or dissolution
or of a certificate of amendment by a member constitutes an
oath or affirmation, under the penalties of perjury, that the
facts stated in the articles or certificate are true and that any
power of attorney used in connection with the execution of the
articles or certificate is proper in form and substance.
1992
48-2b-135. P e n a l t y for false e x e c u t i o n .
Each member or manager of a limited liability company who
signs an}' articles, certificate, statement, report, application,
or other document filed with the division that is known to that
member or manager to be false in any material respect is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
1991
48-2b-136. R e s t a t e d a r t i c l e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n .
(1) A limited liability company may integrate into a single
instrument all of the provisions of its articles of organization
and amendments to them, and it may at the same time also
further amend its articles of organization by adopting restated
articles of organization.
(2) If the restated articles of organization merely restate
and integrate but do not further amend the initial articles of
organization, as previously amended or supplemented by any
certificate or instrument that was executed and filed pursuant
to this chapter, they shall be specifically designated in their
heading as "Restated Articles of Organization", together with
other words that the company considers appropriate, and
shall be executed and filed with the division.
(3) If the restated articles restate and integrate and also
further amend in any respect the articles of organization, as
previously amended or supplemented, they shall be specifically designated in their heading as "Amended and Restated
Articles of Organization", together with other words that the
company considers appropriate, and 6hall be executed and
filed with the division.
(4) (a) Restated articles of organization shall state, either
in their heading or in an introductory paragraph, the
company's present name, and, if it has been changed, the
name under which it was originally filed and the date of
filing of its original articles of organization with the
division. Restated articles shall also state that they were
duly executed and filed in accordance with this section.
(b) If the restated articles only restate and integrate
and do not further amend the provisions of the articles of
organization as previously amended or supplemented and
there is no discrepancy between those provisions and the
provisions of the restated articles, they shall so state.
(5) Upon the filing of the restated articles of organization
with the division, the initial articles, as previously amended or
supplemented, shall be superseded. Thereafter, the restated
articles of organization, including any further amendment cr
changes made by the restated articles, shall be the articles of
organization, but the original effective date of formation shall
remain unchanged.
(6) Any amendment or change made in connection with the
restatement and integration of the articles of organization
shall be subject to any other provision of this chapter, not
inconsistent with this section, that would apply if a separate
certificate of amendment were filed to make the amendment
or change.
issi
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48-2b-137. D i s s o l u t i o n .
A limited liability company organized under this chapter
sha)) be dissolved upon the occurrence of any of the following
events:
(1) when the period fixed for the duration of the limited
liability company in its articles of organization or operating agreement expires;
(2) by written agreement signed by the members entitled to receive a majority of the profits of the limited
liability company, unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement;
(3) except as provided otherwise in the operating
agreement, upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution of a member or upon
the occurrence of any other event that terminates the
continued eligibility for membership of a member in the
limited liability company, unless the business of the
limited liability company is continued by the members:
(a) under a right to continue the business, as
provided in the operating agreement, but only in
accordance with the terms, conditions, and provisions
specified in the operating agreement; or
(b) if the right to continue is not specified in the
operating agreement, by the consent of all remaining
members within 90 days after the event of termination; or
(4) when the limited liability company is not the successor limited liability company in the merger or consolidation of two or more limited liability companies.
1992
48-2b-138. S e t t l e m e n t u p o n d i s s o l u t i o n .
(1) In settling accounts after dissolution, the liabilities of
the limited liability company shall be entitled to payment in
the following order:
(a) liabilities to creditors, in the order of priority as
provided by law, except those liabilities to members of the
limited liability company on account of their contributions;
(b) except as provided in the operating agreement,
liabilities to members of the limited liability company in
respect of their contributions to capital; and
(c) liabilities to members of the limited liability company in respect of their shares of the profits and other
compensation by way of income on tbeir contributions.
(2) Members shall share in the limited liability companyassets as provided in the operating agreement, or if not so
provided, in respect to their claims for capital and in respect to
their claims for profits or for compensation by way of income
on their contributions, respectively, in proportion to the respective amounts of the claims.
1991
48-2b-139. Articles of d i s s o l u t i o n .
When all debts, liabilities, and obligations of the limited
liability company have been paid or discharged, or adequate
provision has been made to do so, and all of the remaining
property and assets of the limited liability company have been
distributed to the members, articles of dissolution shall be
executed. The articles shall set forth:
(1) the name of the limited liability company;
(2) that all state taxes pavable, debts, obligations, and
liabilities have been paid or discharged, or that adequate
provision has been made to do so;
(3) that all the remaining property and assets have
been distributed among its members in accordance with
their respective rights and interests; and
(4) that there are no suits pending against the company in any court or that adequate provision has been
made for the satisfaction of any judgment, order, or decree
that may be entered against it in any pending suit.
1991
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R 3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter'8 death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone new trial granted on ground of inadequacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
875.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.LR. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers'JLiability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq ) — modern cases, 97 A.L R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial *=» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
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obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief."
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
—Real party in interest.
—Refund of fine after dismissal.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Form of motion.
Fraud.
—Burden of proof.
—Divorce action.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
Meritorious.
Merits of claim.
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Factual error.
—Failure to file cost bill.
—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newly discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.

Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time."
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Where a defendant's motion to set aside
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7)
and his motion for a new trial claimed that
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions
by not providing defendant with a copy of
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his
motion for summary judgment to defendant,
which the latter claimed was a clear showing
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could
have believed in denying defendant's motion,
that fraud was not present in what could be
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without
fully understanding its consequences was correctly characterized by trial court as mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdivision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) applied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and
could not be used to circumvent the threemonth filing period. Richins v. Delbert
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
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ordinarily, neither assignment nor garnishment of wages imputes any wrong or misconduct of any kind to debtor. Rugg v. Tolman, 39
Utah 295, 117 P. 54 (1911).
—Waters and water rights.
It was a matter of common knowledge that
on various streams of Utah there were hundreds of farmers and others using water therefrom, many of them with rights recognized
without question for more than half a century.
Brady v. McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188
(1921).
It was a matter of common knowledge in this
state that many controversies between claimants and much litigation resulted prior to 1903
respecting the dates of appropriation by different claimants of the waters of the state.

Rule 301

Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah
25, 239 P. 479, 31 A.L.R. 900 (1925).
It is common knowledge that Great Salt
Lake is navigable, wholly within the boundaries of this state, is 22 percent salt, and is
eighty miles long and from twenty to forty
miles wide. Robinson v. Thomas, 75 Utah 446,
286 P. 625 (1930).
Cited in Lamberth v. Lamberth, 550 P.2d
200 (Utah 1976); Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744
P.2d 301 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Bear River
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); Bullock v. Utah Dep't of Social
Servs., 781 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
State v. Sawyers, 819 P.2d 806 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 74.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error §§ 739 to 743; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 14 to 122; 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1212.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 572;
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 657 to 681; 31

C.J.S. Evidence §§ 6 to 58; 31A C.J.S. Evidence §§ 59 to 102; 88 C.J.S. Trial § 279.
A.L.R. — Judicial notice as to assessed valuations, 42 A.L.R.3d 1439.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 714;
Criminal Law ** 304 to 304(21); Evidence «=* 1
to 52; Trial «=• 191, 192.

ARTICLE III.
PRESUMPTIONS.
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil actions and
proceedings.
(a) Effect, In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by
statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it
is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is
more probable than its existence.
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither presumption applies.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is adapted from Rule 301, Wyoming
Rules of Evidence (1977), which is Rule 301,
Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that
the word "civil" is added in subdivision (a).
Rule 301, Federal Rules of Evidence, is a substantially different rule than that promulgated
by the United States Supreme Court. Rule 301,
as originally proposed by the United States Supreme Court, placed the burden upon the opposing party of establishing the non-existence
of a presumed fact once the party invoking the
presumption had established sufficient facts to
give rise to the presumption, but Rule 3C1 as
promulgated by Congress adopted a substantially different rule limiting the effect of presumption, not otherwise controlled by statute,
to one of going forward with proof rather than
casting the burden of proof upon the opposing
party.
Rule 14, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) provided that except for presumptions which are
conclusive or irrefutable, once the basic fact
supporting the presumption is established "the
presumption continues to exist and the burden
of establishing the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the

presumption operates . . . ," To the same effect, see Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043
(Utah 1975). If evidence to rebut a presumption has not been admitted, the presumption
will determine outcome on the issue; if such
evidence has been admitted, the presumption
will dictate the instruction to be given the jury
on how they are to resolve doubt. There will
continue to be fact combinations which satisfy
the burden of going forward with the evidence
but which are not "presumptions" within the
meaning of this rule and which therefore do
not shift the burden of persuasion. They might
best be called "permissible inferences."
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) did not
prohibit the application of presumptions in
criminal cases. Presumptions in criminal cases
are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953) or any subsequent revision of that section. Recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) and
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
have given a constitutional dimension to presumptions in criminal cases.
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah

631

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 1004

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Photocopies.
—Specific cases.
Photocopies.
—Specific cases.
Where photostatic copies of automobile title
were introduced and oral testimony given that
they were true and exact reproductions of the
originals, photostatic copies were properly admitted into evidence to prove title to automobile. State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d
636 (1972).
A photocopy of a composite drawing identify-

ing the defendant in a robbery case was admissible in evidence after the court found that the
destruction of the original was not done with
fraudulent intent and no prejudice to the defendant's substantive rights resulted. State v.
Wilson, 608 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980).
Photocopies of defendant's palm prints were
sufficiently authenticated and reliable and,
therefore, properly admitted into evidence,
where the photocopied palm prints were identified by a jailer as the only palm prints he had
ever taken. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 975 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 490, 788; 30 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 1012,
1015.

C.J.S. — 32 C.J.S. Evidence
709, 714;
32A C.J.S. Evidence § 815.
Key Numbers. — Evidence *=• 174,175,359.

Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents.
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process or procedure; or
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original
was under the control of the party against whom offered, that party was
put on notice, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the content would be a
subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce the original at the hearing; or
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not
closely related to a controlling issue.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and embodies in a
more comprehensive fashion the provisions of
Rule 70, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective October 1, 1992, revised this
rule to make the language gender-neutral.

Cros8-References. — Original consisting of
numerous accounts, parol evidence of contents,
§ 78-25-16(5).
Proof of instruments affecting real estate,
§ 78-25-13.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Original in possession of opponent.
Cited.
Original in possession of opponent
Within best evidence rule, telegram delivered by telegraph company to receiver was
original. Thus where receiver failed, upon de-

mand, to produce original message received
from telegraph company, admission of carbon
copy from files of sender was not prejudicial
error. B.T. Moran, Inc. v. First Sec. Corp., 82
Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384 (1933).
Cited in Meyer v. General Am. Corp., 569
P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ 448 et seq.
C.J.S. — 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 776 et seq.
A.L.R. — Admissibility in evidence of sound
recording as affected by hearsay and best evidence rules, 58 A.L.R.3d 598.
Admissibility of computerized private business records, 7 A.L.R.4th 8.

Federal Rules of Evidence: admissibility,
pursuant to Rule 1004(1) of other evidence of
contents of writing, recording, or photograph,
where originals were allegedly lost or destroyed, 83 A.L.R. Fed. 554.
Key Numbers. — Evidence •=• 157 et seq.
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ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION OF SURE-TECH LLC

Gary R. Hansen
OlvWon Director

ARTICT.K

I

(Name)
The name of this Limited Liability Company shall be
Sure-Tech LLC.
ARTICLE II
(Term)
The term of this Limited Liability Company shall be perpetual
or until terminated by agreement of its members and managers,

ARTICLE III
(Business Purpose)
Sure-Tech LLC is organized for the purpose of investing in
various companies and projects, however, the LLC may engage in any
activity permitted under Utah law or the laws of the states and/or
territories

of the United

States

wherein

Sure-Tech

LLC is

authorized to do business,
^

ARTICLE IV
(Registered Agent)

:*;

;'•-'
' / •

The Registered Agent for Sure-Tech LLC is Charles A. Schultz'l
who,

by affixing his signature

hereto, hereby

acknowledged-" his ,
CO

' 'J

willingness to act as the Registered Agent on behalf of SurerTechLLC.
Registered Agent:
Charles A. Schultz
345 East 400' Sc>uth, Suite 101
Salt Lake City) Utah 84111

EXHIBIT #_L

Dated this

/S

day of January', 1993.

Charles A. Schultz (Registered Agent)
Additionally, Sure-Tech LLC hereby appoints the Department of
Corporations as its Registered Agent for service of process, if the
Registered Agent named herein has resigned, the agent's authority
has been revoked or if the Agent cannot be found or served after
due diligence.
ARTICLE V
(Principal Place of Business)
The principal place of Business for Sure-Tech LLC shall be 345
East 400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

ARTICLE VI
(Managers of Sure-Tech LLC)
The Managers of Sure-Tsch LLC are:
Robert J. Pett
224 West 7th South
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Charles A. Schultz
345 South East 400, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
the above named individuals shall act as the managers of Sure-Tech
LLC until the first meeting of the members of Sure-Tech LLC or
2

until their successors are elected«
Dated this

of January, 1993.

Charles A. Schultz

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

On the /y

day of January 1993, the above signed Robert J,

TPetrC and Charles A. Schultz personally appeared before roe and die
personally

sign the foregoing Articles of Organization

in my

presence.
Dated this

/y

day of January 1993.

Notary PubBo

Notary Public
No'

•

JSEssr J

' CO

Stateo7utah
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OPERATING AGREEMENT OF
SURE-TECH, LLC.

THIS OPERATING AGREEMENT of Sure-Tech, LLC.. (hereinafter,
sometimes termed "the LLC"), is executed this //^^day of
January, 1993, between Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz,
(hereinafter, referred to as "the Managers"), and Robert J. Pett
and Charles A. Schultz as "Members").
ARTICLE I
[Formation and Principal Place of Business]
Section 1.1: Formation. The Members hereby form a limited
Liability Company pursuant to the provisions of Section 48-2b-101
through 48-2b-156 of the Utah Limited Liability Company Act, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Unless set forth otherwise in
this Operating Agreement, the provisions of Chapter 2, Title 48,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall govern the rights and liabilities
of the parties to this Agreement. If there is a conflict between
provisions of this Agreement and the Utah Limited Liability
Company Act, the provisions of this Agreement shall control
except that if the conflict is with respect to a provision that
would cause the Liability Company to be taxed as an association
for federal income tax purposes, then the provisions of the said
Utah Limited Liability Company Act shall control. The parties
intend that the Liability company shall be taxed as a
partnership. The Managers or Members shall execute and cause to
be filed Articles of Organization, as required by Utah Code
Annotated, Section 48-2b-116, and,- if'applicable, an application
for an assumed name with the Secretary of State for the State of
Utah.
Section 1.2: Name. The Limited Liability Company shall
operate under the name of Sure-Tech, LLC.
Section 1.3: Principal Place of Business. The principal
place of business and the location where Limited Liability
Company records are to be maintained shall be at 345 East 400
South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. The business of
the Limited Liability Company may also be conducted at such other
or additional place or places as may be designated by the
Managers and Members.
Section 1.4: The Members. The names and places of
residence of each Member of the Limited Liability Company are as
follows:
.Robert J. Pett
224 West 7th South
Brigham City, Utah 84302

EXHIBIT # &

Charles A. Schultz
640 South 2nd West
Brigham City, Utah 84302

SECTION 1.4-1: The Managers. The names and places of
residence of each Managers of the Limited Liability Company are
as follows:
Robert J. Pett
224 West 7th South
Brigham City, Utah 843 02

Charles A, Schultz
640 South 2nd West
Brigham City, Utah 84 3 02

Section 1.5: Registered Agent. The name of the Limited
Liability Company's Registered Agent and the address of its
initial registered office is:
Registered Agent:
Charles A. Schultz
345 East 400 South, Suite 101
SLC, UT 84111
ARTICLE II
[Purposes of the Limited Liability Company]
The LLC is formed for the purpose of investing in various
companies and projects, however, Sure-Tech, L L C , may engage in
any activity permitted under Utah law or the laws of the states
and/or territories of the United States wherein Sure-Tech, L L C ,
is authorized to do business.
ARTICLE III
[Term of the Limited Liability Company]
The LLC shall commence as of January 13, 1993 and shall
continue for an indefinite period of time or until terminated by
action of the Members or as hereinafter provided by this
Agreement, unless terminated by law by the operation of law at an
earlier date.
ARTICLE IV
[Accounting for the Limited Liability Company]
Section 4.1: Method of Accounting. The LLC shall keep its
accounting records and shall report for income tax purposes on
the cash basis. The records shall be maintained in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles.
Section 4.2: Annual Statements. The Managers shall cause
financial statements to be prepared not less than annually,
provide any income is produced, and copies of the statement shall
be delivered to each Member. Copies of all income tax returns
filed by the LLC also shall be furnished to all Members.
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Section 4.3: Access to Accounting Records. Any Member
shall have reasonable access to the accounting records of the LLC
during regular business hours of the LLC.
Section 4.4: Income Tax Information. The Managers shall
provide to each Member information of the LLC f s taxable income or
loss and each class of income, gain, or deduction that is
relevant to reporting the LLC's income. The information shall
also show each Members1 distributive share of each class of
income, gain, loss, or deduction. This information shall be
furnished to the Members as sooft as possible after the close of
the LLC's taxable year.
Section 4.5: Interim Financial Statement. On written
request, any Member shall be entitled to copies of any interim
financial statements prepared for the Managers.
Section 4.6: Articles of Organization. The Managers shall
not be required to mail a cop^ of the Articles of Organization to
each Member. Provided, however, upon written request therefor,
the Managers shall mail a copy of the Articles of Organization to
the requesting Member, the costs thereof to be born by such
requesting Member.
Section 4.7: Cost of Inspection of Records — Right to
Information. Each Member has the right to records of the LLC.
The cost of providing such information shall be the sole
responsibility of the Member who requests the same unless a
Manager in its sole and absolute discretion determines that the
LLC should bear such costs.
ARTICLE V
[Capital Contributions]
Section 5.1: Initial Capital Contribution. The initial
capital contributions to the LLC shall all be made in cash. The
cash contributed by each Member and the percentage of said
capital contributions contributed by each Member is as follows:
Members:

VALUE

PERCENTAGE

Robert Pett

$10.00

1%

Charles A. Schultz

$990.00

99%

Section 5.2: Respective Interests of Members in the Initial
Capital Contribution. The interests of the Members in the
capital originally contributed shall be those same percentages as
are set forth in Section 5.1.
Section 5.3: Additional Capital Contributions. Additional
capital contributions to the capital of the LLC beyond those
3

12.2-1: Transfer of Interest upon Death. Nothing contained
in this Agreement, however, shall prevent the interest of
any Member from being transferred or disposed of by
will or
by intestacy to or for the benefit of the Members1 immediate
family; provided, however, that transfers by way of
testamentary or inter vivo1fs trusts must have trustees who
are members of the Members immediate family; immediate
family is defined as parents, spouse, or issue of the Member
or the Members1 spouse. With regard to such transfer, any
legal representative or heir shall become a Member in law
and fact after the costs referred to in Section 12•2-3: have
been paid.
12.3: Additional Members. No new Members may be added
without the unanimous written consent of the present Members.
New Members may only be added by written consent of the present
Members and upon such terms' and conditions as specified by the
present Members.
ARTICLE XIII
[Voluntary Dissolution]
Section 13.1: Winding Uft the LLC. On any voluntary
dissolution, the LLC shall immediately commence to wind up its
affairs. The Members shall continue to share profits and losses
during the period of liquidation in the same proportions as
before dissolution. The proceeds from liquidation of LLC assets
shall be applied as follows:
13.1-1: Payment to creditors of the LLC, other than
Members, in the order of priority provided by law.
13.1-2: Payment to Managers and Members for unpaid salaries
and for the credit balances in their drawing accounts.
-13.1-3: Payment to the Members of the credit balances in
- their capital accounts.
Section 13.2: Gains or Losses in Process of Liquidation.
Any gain or loss on disposition of LLC properties in liquidation
shall be credited or charged to the Members in the proportions of
their interest in profits or losses as specified in Section 7.1.
Any property distributed in kind in liquidation shall be valued
and treated as though the property were sold and the cash
proceeds were distributed. The difference between the value of
property distributed in kind and its book value shall be treated
as a gain or loss on sale of the property and shall be credited
or charged to the Members in the proportions of their interests
in profits or losses as specified in Section 7.1.
Section 13.3: Balance Owed by a Member. Should any Member
have a debit balance in his capital account, whether by reason of
13

losses in liquidating LLC assets or otherwise, the debit balance
shall represent an obligation from him to the other Members, to
be paid in cash within thirty (3 0) days after written demand by
the other Members.
ARTICLE

XIV

[Expulsion of a Member]
A Member or Manager may be expelled from the LLC at any time
upon an affirmative vote of One Hundred percent (100%) of the
Members of the LLC, other than the Member whose expulsion is
proposed. The expulsion shall be effective immediately upon
delivery to the expelled Member of written notice of his
expulsion. The remaining Members shall continue the LLC under
its present name, and they shall pay to the expelled Members the
value of his interest in the LLC pursuant to Article 10.2.
ARTICLE XV
[Amendments]
This Limited Liability Company Operating Agreement may only
be amended by a written agreement executed by all Managers and
the Members.
ARTICLE XVI
[Miscellaneous Provisions]
16.1: Waiver. The waiver by any party to this Agreement,
of any of the terms, covenants or conditions of this Agreement,
shall not he deemed a waiver of such party's
right to
enforce
that term, covenant or condition at a subsequent date or on a
subsequent occasion. Nor shall any waiver be construed to
prohibit any of the parties to this Agreement from enforcing any
of the oth^r terms, covenants or conditions of this Agreement.
Any alleged waiver of any of the terms, covenants and conditions,
of this Agreement, or breaches thereof, shall not b^ enforceable
unless such waiver is in writing specifically setting forth which
term, covenant, condition or other action or inaction is being
waived.
16.2: Third Party Beneficiaries. Subject to the provisions
of Article 12.2-1: of this Agreement, no provision of this
Agreement nor any document incorporated herein, is intended to
confer, and shall not be construed to confer, any rights on any
person or entity that is not a party to this Agreement.
16.3: Captions and Definitions. The Captions used in this
Agreement are for convenience only and shall not be deemed to be
relevant in resolving any question of the interpretation or
construction of part of this Agreement.
14

16.4: Invalidity of Provisions. If, for any reason
whatsoever, any of the provisions contained in this Agreement are
determined to be unlawful or unenforceable it is the express
intent of the Members that the remainder of the Agreement shall
remain in full force and effect.
16.5: Jurisdiction, Venue and Applicable Law. This
Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with,
the laws of the State of Utah. Any action to enforce any of the
provisions of this Agreement sh^ll be filed in the Third District
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which Court shall apply
Utah law. The parties to this Agreement hereby voluntarily
consent to venue and jurisdiction in the referenced court.
16.6: Attorney's Fees. Should any party to this Agreement
be required to employ an attorney to enforce any of the terms,
covenants or conditions of this Agreement, to collect any damages
or to enforce or enjoin any action, the prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover reasonable its costs and reasonable
attorney f s fees.
16.7: Notices. All notice required or permitted to be sent
to Sure-Tech, L L C , under the provisions of this Agreement shall
be sent by Certified Mail, addressed to Sure-Tech, LLC., 345 East
400 South, Suite 101, Salt Lake City 84111. Such notices shall
be effective upon receipt and acknowledgment of receipt by SureTech , LLC.
16.8: Entirety of Agreement. This Agreement constitutes
the entirety of the Agreement among the parties hereto. This
Agreement and any of its terms, covenants, conditions, or other
provisions may only be altered, amended, modified, or revoked in
writing as provided in this Agreement. It is expressly agreed
and understood that all prior or contemporaneous negotiations,
representations or agreements are merged in this Agreement, and
that no oral representations, promises or negotiations, of any
nature whatsoever, shall survive the execution of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties have signed this Limited
Liability Company Operating Agreement the day and year first
above written.
Managers:
Each Manager, signatory hereto, hereby acknowledges that he
is signing under penalty of perjury,

•

Robert J. Sett

Charles A. Schultz
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Members:
Each Member, signatory hereto, hereby acknowledges that he
is signing under penalty of perjury,

Robert J. Pjext

Charles A. Schultz
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INITIAL.MEETING OF
SURE-TECH, LLC.
The initial meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, L L C , was
held January 16, 1993, at 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the only members of

the LLC, were present.

It was agreed that Charles A. Schultz

would act as the primary manager of Sure-Tech, although Robert
Pett would also serve as a manager.

It was further agreed that

the Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech would be ratified and
signed.
Dated this

/{r*

day of January 1993.

Robert J. Pdtt

Charles A. Schultz

T ^ "

EXHIBIT # J £

FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF
SURE-TECH, LLC.
The first annual meeting of the members of Sure-Tech, L L C ,
was held January 26, 1994, at 640 South 2nd, West Brigham City.
Robert J. Pett and Charles Schultz, the only members of the LLC,
were present.

Because Sure-Tech and not made any money in the

previous year, it was agreed that no annual report was necessary.
Likewise because no money had been made in the prior year, it was
agreed that no tax return need be filed.

It was also agreed that

there would be no changes in management or operation of the LLC.
Dated this Q_(j> day of January 1994.

cXHiBIT #.

5

SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF
SURE-TECH, LLC.
The SECOND ANNUAL MEETING of the members of Sure-Tech, LLC, was
held February 19, 1995, at 224 West 7th South, Brigham City. Robert J. Pett and
Charles Schultz, the only members of the LLC, were present. Once again, because SureTech and not made any money in the previous year, it was agreed that no Annual
Report was would be prepared, and for the present time no tax return would be filed for
1994. It was also agreed that there would be no changes in management or operation of
the LLC, and that Sure-Tech would continue its litigation against EML, et. al.

RobertXPetTT

J

Schultz
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAII

}

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }
rRobert

1.

J. Pett, being first duly; sworn, state as follows:
I, Robert J. Pett, have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this

Affidavit.
2.

In late December 1992 or early January 1993, I was asked by Steven Evans to

become a member and manager of an LLC with Charles Schultz.
3.

At that time, Mr. Evans explained to me that he could not be a member of the

LLC because he had tax problems and he was afraid that the IRS would levy on his interest in
the LLC if he were a member and that the levy would make the LLC ineffective.
4.

Mr. Evans also explained to me, at that time, that his father also had tax

problems and could not be a member of the LLC for the same reason that he, Steve, could not
be a member.
5.

Mr. Evans explained to me that the purpose of the LLC was to distribute profits

received from a company called EML Projects to various people, including himself, who for
various reasons could not be members of the LLC. At that time Steve also promised me that I
would be compensated for acting as a member and manager of the LLC.
6.

I agreed to be a member and manager so long as Charles was the one mainly

responsible for the operation of the LLC.

EXHIBIT # C

7.

The previously referenced meeting with Mr. Evans and Mr. Schultz was held at

Mr. Schultz's office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah;
8.

On January 14, 1993, I signed the Articles of Organization for Sure-Tech LLC.

9.

The Articles were signed at Mr. Schultz's office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake

City, Utah. A copy of the Articles is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1.
10.

The Initial Meeting of Sure-Tech was held on January 16, 1993, at Mr. Schultz's

office a 345 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. A copy of the Minutes of the Initial Meeting
is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2.
11.

At the Initial Meeting on January 16, 1993, Charles and I reviewed, adopted and

signed an Operating Agreement for Sure-Tech. A copy of that Agreement signed by me is
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 3.
12.

Steve Evans was not present at the Meeting because Charles and I were, and are,

the only members and managers of Sure-Tech.
13.

Sometime in November 1993, Charles gave me a copy of the Annual Report he

was going to file for Sure-Tech 1993, and I reviewed it. A copy of that Report is attached to
this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 4.
14.

On January 26, 1994, Charles and I held the First Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech.

15.

The Meeting was held at Charles' home in Brigham City.

16.

Only Charles and 1 were present because we were, and are, the only members of

Sure-Tech.
17.

At that Meeting we discussed the fact that EML had not made any money and

that Sure-Tech had not received any money from EML; therefore, we agreed that we did not
need to file a tax return for Sure-Tech. A copy of the Minutes of the First Annual Meeting of
Sure-Tech is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 5.
18.

Sometime in December 1994, Charles gave me a copy of the Annual Report he

was going to file for Sure-Tech for the 1994 year, and I reviewed it. A copy of that Report is
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 6.
19.

On February 19, 1995, Charles and I held the Second Annual Meeting of Sure-

Tech at my home in Brigham City, Utah.
20.

At that Meeting we again discussed the fact that Sure-Tech had not received any

money. Therefore, we again agreed that we did not need to file a tax return for Sure-Tech and
that Sure-Tech would continue its litigation against EML. A copy of the Minutes of the Second
Annual Meeting of Sure-Tech is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 7.
21.

I was at part of the Hearing in this matter held on May 30, 1995.

22.

Though I did not hear him testify, I am told that Steve Evans testified that some

sort of notice of a meeting of the members of Sure-Tech was sent to me. I do not believe that
any notice was sent, but if it was I never received any such notice.
23.

I never authorized any changes in the membership or management of Sure-Tech.

There was never any request for a change in membership or management of Sure-Tech.
24.

I never authorized my interest in Sure-Tech to be transferred to anyone.

25.

At no time has Steve Evans, his father, his mother or anyone else other than

Charles and me ever claimed to be members or managers of Sure-Tech.
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26.

I am aware that at the creation of Sure-Tech, Steve and Charles were working on

some sort of agreement on how the money received from EML by Sure-Tech would be divided,
but to the best of my knowledge, no agreement was ever reached.
27.

In any event, no money was ever generated by Sure-Tech, so how the money

would be distributed is irrelevant, but the distribution of any money received from EML had
nothing whatsoever to do with the ownership or management of Sure-Tech, because as Steve
explained to me before Sure-Tech was formed, Steve and his dad could not own any interest in
Sure-Tech.
28.

I am aware that there has been some suggestion that some of the Exhibits

attached to this Affidavit were not prepared at the time specified on the Exhibits. I personally
know that all of the Exhibits attached to this Affidavit were signed on the dates specified on the
Exhibits.

Dated this ^ T ^ d a y of June 1995.

Subscribed and sworn to thi

v

day of June 1995.
NOfAUV i'l.'IIIJC
LISA A. SPJVEY

/

y pa./ ^(__ K S,>/OtU
,/ Notary
Motary Public ~ ~ 7

251*4 Dt uitioin
Salt Lako C>ly Utah 84106
My Comm<ss»on Cxpues
November i \UJU

ST AT J- 1)1 l« I A l l

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

}

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE}
I, Lisa A. Spivey, being first duly sworn, state as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this Affidavit.

2.

On November 22, 1994, I personally mailed the letter attached to this

Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1.
3.

The Letter was sent Certified Mail to Steve Evans.

4.

The letter was only sent to Steve Evans.

5.

I was in court today, May 30, 1995, when Steve Evans testified under oath

that he never received the November 22, 1994 letter, from Mr. Schultz.
6

Steve Evans' statement to the Court was not true.

7.

The letter was received and signed for by Pam Evans, Steve Evans' wife,

on November 26, 1994. A copy of the Return for Certified Mail is attached to this
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2.
8.

I have possession of the original Return.

9.

Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 3, is a copy of a letter from Bryan

Fishburn, dated April 4, 1995, wherein Mr. Fishburn acknowledges the he was given a
copy of the November 22, 1994 letter.

EXHIBIT # S

10.

The April 4, 1995 letter, references the November 22, 1994 letter, from

Steve Evans.
11.

If Mr. Fishburn has a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter, he receivcu u

from someone other than from Mr. Schultz or me. No copy of the November 22, 1994
letter, was sent to Mr. Fishburn.
Dated this

day of May 1995.

Subscribed and sworn to this

day of May 1995.

Notaiyftlblic
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Charles A. Schults
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
Telephone: (801)466-7308

CERTIFIED MMl
November 22, 1994
Steve Evans
1902 Mary Dott Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84in*
Steve:
I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the bearing today. The c^tsc against
EML was only filed in order to secure your rights to work in the environmental field and
particularly the right to use the waste watpr treatn*ent system you assigned to EML
However, due to your failure to attend the bearing and tfuc also tp Lionel's failure to
attend, I was disqualified as counsel for Surc-Tecb.
If you do not care about protecting your interests, I sure as hell qon't. I am going to
settle the suit against EML on the best reims for Sure-Tech. A settlement may have
some incidental and unintentional affect on your patent claims. Therefore, I suggest that
you obtain personal legal representation to advise you.

Charles A. Schuitz
CAS/lbk
cc:

file

EXHIBIT

fcL,—
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AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF UTAH

}
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE }
I, Charles A. Schultz, being first duly sworn, state as follows:
1.

I have personal knowledge of the statements contained in this Affidavit.

2.

On November 22, 1994, I prepared and signed the letter attached to this

Affidavit as Exhibit No. 1.
3.

The letter was sent Certified Mail to Steve Evans.

4.

The letter was only sent to Steve Evans.

5.

The letter was received and signed for by Pam Evans, Steve Evans' wife,

on November 26, 1994. A copy of the Return for Certified Mail is attached to this
Affidavit as Exhibit No. 2.
6.

The letter, referenced in paragraph No. 5 of this Affidavit, is the letter I

testified about at the May 30, 1995 hearing before Judge Brian.
7.

I did not have the letter at the hearing because I did not know the hearing

was going to be an evidentiary hearing. I only received the Notice of Hearing on Friday
May 26, 1995, and the Notice did not indicate that it was an evidentiary hearing. The
Notice of Hearing merely indicated that the Hearing was a one-half hour motion
hearing, not an evidentiary hearing. A copy of the Notice is attached to this Affidavit as

FXHIRITtf

0

Exhibit No. 3.
8.

Had I known the hearing was an evidentiary hearing, I would have brought

all of my files to the Hearing and arranged for additional witnesses to testify, but Daniels
Request for a Hearing did not ask for an evidentiary hearing and the notice only stated
that a 30 minute motion hearing would be held. A copy of Daniels' Request for Hearing
is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 4. Therefore, I did not bring all of my files to
the hearing. Furthermore, Mr. Guyon only had 20 minutes to prepare for the hearing;
therefore, he did not have time to properly prepare and instruct me to bring additional
documents to the Hearing.
9.

There is no doubt that Steve Evans received Exhibit No. 1, as he

apparently gave a copy of it to Brian Fishburn. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No.
5, is a copy of a letter from Bryan Fishburn, dated April 4, 1995, wherein Mr. Fishburn
acknowledges the he was given a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter.
10.

The April 4, 1995 letter, references the November 22, 1994 letter, from

Steve Evans. If Mr. Fishburn has a copy of the November 22, 1994 letter, he received it
from someone other than me or my office. No copy of the November 22, 1994 letter,
was ever sent to Mr. Fishburn.
11.

Subsequent to the time I sent Exhibit No. 1 to Steve Evans, I had a

conversation with him wherein he admitted receiving the letter. He claimed that he
could not get a flight to Utah, and that was the reason he did not attend the November
22, 1994 hearing. During that conversation, I again told him that Bob and I would not

convey Sure-Tech to him or any of his family, and that I was going to settle the SureTech case on my own.
12.

Subsequent to the May 30, 1995, hearing, in reviewing my files, I found a

letter from Fred Evans and Beatrice Evans, Steve's parents, to the Defendants in this
matter, wherein they acknowledge that Bob Pett and I are the sole owners of Sure-Tech.
A copy of that letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 6. In that letter, Mr. and
Mrs. Evans acknowledge that Bob and I own 20% of EML. Sure-Tech ownes 20% of
EML. Therefore, if Bob and I own 20% of EML, Bob and I own 100% of Sure-Tech.
Neither Steve, his mother, his dad, or his wife were ever members of Sure-Tech, and
Bob and I never conveyed our ownership of Sure-Tech to any of them. A copy of the
limited partnership agreement for EML is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit No. 7.
Dated this - '

day of June 1995.

Charles A. Schultz
Subscribed and sworn to this^V / day of June 1995.

NOTARY PUBLIC

USA A* SPIVEY

/,

tyotary Public

P/i/^f

y

2654 Dearborn
& * Uk« City, Utah 6410*
My ComoOftoo Explft*
NovtmtMW 1,1W«
STATE OF UTAH

Charles A. Schulbt
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
Telephone: i'801> 466-7308

CERTIFIED MAIL
November 22, 1994
Steve Evans
1902 Mary Dott Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Steve:
I cannot believe you did not bother to come to the hearing today. The case against
EML was only filed in order to secure your rights to work in the environmental field and
particularly the right to use the waste water treatment system you assigned to EML.
However, due to your failure to attend the hearing and dye also tp Lionel's failure to
attend, I was disqualified as counsel for Sure-Tech.If you do not care about protecting your interests, 1 sure as hell don't. I am going to
settle the suit against EML on the best feims for Sure-Tech. A settlement may have
some incidental and unintentional affea on your patent claims. Therefore, i suggest that
you obtain personal legal representation to advise you.

Charles A. Schultz
CAS/lbk
cc:

file
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Print your name, address and ZIP Code here

Cnarles A. Schultz
Attorney at Law
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SENDER:
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• Complete items 3. and 4 a & b.
• Print your name and address on the reverse of this form so fee):
that w e can return this card to you.
1. D Addressee's Address
• Attach this form to the front of the mailpiece, or on the
back if space does not permit.
?. LJ Restricted Delivery
• Write "Return Receipt Requested" on the mailpiece next to
k
Consult postmaster tot fue
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1 4 a . Article Number
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D
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6. Signature (Agent)
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November 16, 1994
P. Bryan Fishburn
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
From: Mr. and Mrs. Fred B. Evans
Dear Mr. Fishburn:
Bryan as was discussed on Tuesday, we have written down an offer to settle
as you know we are not able to speak for Sure-Tech but we have talked to
Charles Schultz and he has assured us he*will go along with our suggested offer.
We will settle the issues on the following terms and conditions:
1. Equipment Lease shall be canceled upon payment of $50,000 dollars which
shall make up for disposed of equipment and chemical and damaged equipment.
2. Patent pending Waste Water Treatment System will be returned back to
Steven Evans. The assignment canceled.
3. Sure-Tech, Charles Schultz and Robert Pett shall be paid $50,000 dollars,
in return, will return their 20% interest in EMLP.
4. Everyone will agree to indemnity and hold harmless one another from
any and all present or future litigation. All agreements and contracts
between one another shall be canceled.
If this settlement offer is acceptable to you, please contact me as soon
as possible, so we can work out the details.
Sincerely yours,

Fred B. Evans
Beatrice Evans

EXHIBIT # _ &

1.3 Duration. The Partnership shall commence as of the date of this Partnership
Agreement, and shall continue until January 1, 2050, or until terminated pursuant to Article
VII ot this Partnership Agreement, unless sooner terminated by process of law.
1.4 Nature of Business. The principal business of the Partnership shall be to develop
and implement a technology for the treatment of wastewater and for the recovery and removal
of metals and hazardous materials from wastewater, soil and other waste products, and to
engage in any other lawful act or activity not otherwise prohibited by law.
1.5 General Partner. The name and address the General Partner and the General
Partner's Interest in the Partnership is:
NAME

ADDRESS

INTEREST

WASTE PRODUCTS, INC.

6985 Union Park Center,
Suite 545,
Midvale, Utah 84047

5 Units

1.6 Limited Partners. The name and place of residence of each Limited Partner and
the Interest of each Limited Partner in the Partnership is:
NAME

ADDRESS

INTEREST

SURETECH, LLC.

345 East 400 South
Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

20 Units

ECOLOGY MANAGEMENT,
LTD.

6985 Union Park Center,
Suite 545,
Midvale, Utah 84047

75 Units

1.7 Issuance of Limited Partnership Units. Each Partner's Interest in the Partnership
shall be denominated by Units of Partnership Interest ("Units"), and the total number of Units
that the Partnership shall have authority to issue initially is One Hundred (100), five (5) of
which shall be issued to the General Partner and shall represent the General Partner's Interest
in the Partnership, and ninety-five (95) of which shall be issued to Limited Partners and
represent the Limited Partners' Interests in the Partnership. All of the Units which the
Partnership is presently authorized to issue shall, upon the execution hereof and payment for
such Units as herein agreed be deemed to be issued as set forth above in paragraphs 1.5 and
1.6. The General Partner shall be authorized to issue additional Units only with the
concurrence of Limited Partners owning more than seventy-five percent (75%) of the
Partners' Interests in the Partnership then outstanding.
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Charles A. Schultz
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
-fjjgS
Telephone: (801)466-7308
fftj© O ^ ^ O ^ 0 1
? 6Y ^

April 25, 1995
Judge Pat B. Brian
Third District Judge
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Sure-Tech v. EML. etal. Case No. 940902389 CV.
Dear Judge Brian:

Today, I received a copy of a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice and an
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice prepared by Richard K. Nebeker, acting as counsel for
EML> et. al. (Copies enclosed). The Stipulation was also signed by Scott Daniels, as
counsel for Sure-Tech. Mr. Daniels has no authority to represent Sure-Tech in this
matter. Mr. Daniels has never been retained to act as counsel for Sure-Tech. No one
representing Sure-Tech has ever spoken to Mr. Daniels about this case, and Sure-Tech
does not authorize dismissal of this case.
Robert Pett and I are the only managers of Sure-Tech, and we are the only
members. Neither of us ever asked Mr. Daniels to represent Sure-Tech in any
proceeding, and neither one of us ever authorized Mr. Daniels to sign a stipulation
dismissing the referenced matter. Therefore, as a Manager and member of Sure Tech
and on behalf of Mr. Pett as a manager and member of Sure-Tech, I ask that you not
sign the Order of Dismissal, as Mr. Daniels is not authorized to represent Sure-Tech and
dismiss the law suit.
Respectfully:

Charles A. Schultz
CAS/lbk
cc:

Robert J. Pett
Scott Daniels
Richard K. Nebeker
file

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SURE-TECH
PLAINTIFF,
-VSE M L PROJECTS
ECOLOGY MANAGEMENT

NOTICE
CASE NO. 940902389 CV
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN

DEFENDANT.

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT THE ABOVE-NAMED CASE HAS BEEN SET BEFORE
JUDGE PAT B BRIAN, AS FOLLOWS:
THIS CASE IS SET FOR MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 30 MINUTES.
DATE: MAY 30, 1995
PLACE: ROOM 310

TIME: 9:00 A.M.
ADDRESS: CIRCUIT COURT BUILDING
200 EAST 451 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
PHONE: (801) 535-5581

DATED THIS 22ND DAY OF MAY, 1995

JUDGE/DEPUTY CLERK

J^W"

COPIES MAILED TO PARTIES OR COUNSEL AT THE ADDRESSES INDICATED ON
THE ATTACHED MAILING CERTIFICATE.

lf m , e s s { t h r e e
the proceeding.
*">««$ clays prior to
TDD phone for hearing impaired, 535-5009.

MR. DANIELS:
we settled the case.

That's the order that I submitted when

Mr. Schultz has taken the position that I

can/t do that, because I don't represent Sure-Tech, and that's
the issue here today, and why I asked for a hearing, because I
guess we need to take some evidence and determine just who is
Sure-Tech, and that's the issue*
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. DANIELS:

I would like to call Mr. Steve Evans as

a witness.
STEVEN THOMAS EVANS,
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DANIELS:
Q.

State your full name for the record.

A.

Steven Thomas Evans.

Q.

Are you familiar with a business entity known as

Sure-Tech?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

What kind of a business entity is that?

A.

It is an LLC.

Q.

Limited liability company?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are you a member of that?

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Are you at this moment a manager of Sure-Tech?

A.

Mo, I am not.

Q.

Who are the managers of Sure-Tech, to your knowledge?

A.

Well, at this time, we had a meeting of members, and

Fred Evans and Lionel Koon were elected as the new managers.
Q.

Fred Evans is your father?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked Plaintiff's

Exhibit 1.

Do you recognize that document?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What is that?

A.

This was the original document, when Sure-Tech was

first put together, as to who the members or the make-up of
members was to be.
Q.

Were there changes in that, subsequently?

A.

Yes, there were.

Mr. Bradshaw was not included in as

any involvement in Sure-Tech, and we rearranged, you know, what
the positions were.

It was going to be Charles Schultz and

Robert Pett were to be the managers, and myself, my father, my
mother and Charlie were to have ownership.
Q.

So this 2 6 percent that belonged to Dean Bradshaw was

supposed to be distributed through the other members?
A.

No, we just canceled it out.

Q.

So your percentage increased to over something over

50 percent, I guess?

4

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

That's a document that, in your view, settles this

case?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Let me back up a little bit.

The Sure-Tech

corporation, or LLC, was formed and the articles filed,
according to the exhibit, January 14, 1993?
A.

Uh-huh (affirmative)•

Q.

At that time you were about a 50-percent owner,

right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Your father and mother owned some percentage?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Schultz owned some percentage?

A.

That's right.

Q.

What was the purpose of Sure-Tech?

What was its

function?
A.

Well, it was set up —

I developed some applications

for water treatment, and we entered into a contract with a
company called Ecology Management, which EML Projects, Ltd.,
where I assigned the future patent rights.

In return for them

having the right to sell that or market that waste treatment
system, which I had ownership to, we were to be given 20percent ownership of EML Projects, Ltd.

So we then set up

Sure-Tech, LLC, because Charlie had been involved with us in

8

1

past businesses.

My father had been involved, and myself.

2

ve set up Sure-Tech, LLC, as the vehicle to be able to disburse

3

all profit and loss.

4

Robert Pett, were set up as the managers of Sure-Tech, LLC,

5

because I had tax liability, and I couldn't show as any part to

6

it.

Mr. Schultz and then his law clerk,

7

Q.

You didn't want your name on the public records?

8 I

A.

That's right.

9 1

Q.

In your view, you were a member?

A.

Yes.

10
11

Well, from my view, I owned the company.

Q.

Then your father owned some?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And Mr. Schultz owned some.

15

contribute?

16

A.

18 I

I was

the largest owner of the company.

12

17

So

What did he do to

Mr. Schultz contributed some cash, but it was mostly

his time and energy as an attorney and legal counsel.
Q.

You kind of paid your attorney's fees by giving him

19

part of it?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

The purpose of the LLC was to distribute the money

22

you received

23 I

A.

—

It was to distribute any of the profit or loss that

24

would be received from EML Projects, Ltd., bacfc to us.

25

what an LLC is set up for.

That's

You can have that vehicle so that

1

THE COURT:

2 I

MR. NEBEKER:

3

THE COURT:

4
5
6 I
7

Cross-examination?
The defendant has no questions.
You may proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. GUYON:
Q.

Mr. Schultz, when did you first became aware of the

organization of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, here?

8

A.

Mr. Evans, you mean?

9 1

Q.

Yeah.

A.

We organized Sure-Tech, LLC back when we started

10
11

negotiations with EML Projects, Ltd., and that was in December,

12

I believe, of '93.

13

Q.

I have here the articles of incorporation, which

14

indicate they were signed and prepared on the 13th and 14th of

15

January of 1993.

16

activity?

Do you have any recollection of that

17

A.

You mean Exhibit 4?

18 I

Q.

I believe that is the exhibit.

19

A.

Yes.

20 I

Q.

The signatures there, Mr. Robert Pett and

21

Mr. Schultz; is that correct?

22

A.

That's right.

23

Q.

You indicated in your prior testimony that the first

24

meeting that you attended was one that was recently held, at

25

which the managers were changed; is that correct?

17

I
A.

That's right.

Q.

You never attended any meeting prior to that time?

A.

No.

Q.

Are you aware of the existence of an operating

agreement of Sure-Tech, Ltd.?
A*

There was none.

Q.

There was none?
I am sorry, your Honor, I only have an original and

copy.

May I approach?
THE COURT:

Q.

You may.

Mr. Schultz —

I mean Mr. Evans, what is the title of

that document?
A.

It shows here operating agreement of Sure-Tech, LLC.

Q.

I am going to direct your attention to pages 15 and

16 of that agreement.

Are there signatures there?

A.

Yes, there are.

Q.

Are they original signatures?

A.

I can't attest to that, but they look original.

They

are in blue inX.
Q.

Whose signatures are there?

A.

Robert Pett and Charles A. Schultz.

Q.

Directing your attention to section 1.4 on the first

page of that document, whose names occur there?
A.

Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz.

Q.

Directing your attention to section 1.4-1, the top of

18

1

the next page 2, indicates the managers?

2

A*

Robert J. Pett, Charles A. Schultz.

3

Q.

Directing your attention to page 3, article 5,

4

section 5.1, indicates the members and the percentage of their

5

contribution and its value.

6

of Robert J. Pett's capital contribution, from that document?

What is the contribution and value

7

A.

It shows $10.

8

Q»

That's what percentage?

9 I

A*

1 percent.

10

Q.

And it shows below that Mr. Schultz?

11

A.

$990.

12

Q.

What percentage is that?

13

A.

99 percent.

14
15

MR. GUYON:

agreement of Sure-Tech.

16
17

I move for the admission of the operating

MR. DANIELS:

Objection, lack of foundation.

He has

never seen it before.

18

THE COURT:

The Court will give you an opportunity to

19

conduct voir dire on the foundation question, if you would

20

like.

21
22

MR. DANIELS:

Have you ever seen that document

before today?

23

THE WITNESS:

No, I have not.

24

MR. DANIELS:

That's all.

25

THE COURT:

Objection is overruled.

It is received.

19

1

membership of the corporation?

2

A.

Yes, ve did.

3

Q.

Are you familiar with the applicable provisions of

4

the limited liability partnership act as to that position?

5

A.

Yes.

6 J

Q.

What do they provide, to your knowledge?

7

A.

Well, an LLC is put together to be able to distribute

8

profit or loss to the members, and as we were to receive the

9

profit or loss, that makes us members, and by being that we

10

were members, we then held the meeting and made the changes.

11

Q.

Are you aware of the specific provision of the Utah

12

Code Annotated Section 48-2b-131, which deals with transfer of

13

membership?

14

A.

I have read through that, but no.

15

Q.

If I indicated to you that specifically it says or

16

deals with —

17

to receive the majority of the nontransferred profits do not

18

consent, the transferee has no right to participate in the

19

management of the business.

says that if the nontransferring members entitled

20

MR. DANIELS:

21

MR. GUYON:

I am sorry, what was your question?
Is he familiar with that?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Are you familiar with the operating agreement

24
25

requirements as to the transfer of ownership and management?
A.

Yes.

21

1

Q.

What does that provide?

2

A.

If I remember right, as far as being a member or

3

whatever, and going by what was filed by Mr. Schultz and

4

Mr. Pett when the company was first formed, having the first

5

meeting of members, we were able to and were to change the

6

managers.

7

Q.

Are you familiar with Section 48-2b-122 of the code,

8

which relates to the filing of, creating of additional members?

9

It says, and I will quote, may be familiar with this, "'After

10

the filing of a limited liability company/s original articles

11

of organization, additional members may be admitted as provided

12

in the operating agreement."

13

conditions of the operating agreement in admitting yourselves

14

as members to this limited liability corporation?

Did you comply with the terms and

15

A.

There was no operating agreement.

16

Q.

It says, "If the operating agreement does not provide

17

for the additional members, with the written consent of all

18

members, except that, notwithstanding any provision of the

19

operating agreement, no additional member may be admitted

20

without the written consent of the members entitled to receive

21

a majority of the profits of the company."

22

written consent of Mr. Pett and Mr. Schultz in performing your

23

change of administration of this limited liability corporation?

24
25

A.

Did you obtain

No.
MR. GUYON:

I have nothing further.

22

with Sure-Tech in that lawsuit*
Q.

And a response was received, you indicated, some

months subsequent?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Approximately how long was that?

A.

it was just about two months.

Q.

Had there been a change in circumstances between the

writing of your letter, Exhibit 6, and at receipt of the
response, Exhibit 7?
A.
week —

Yes.

Prior to that time, approximately —

I guess a

no, probably ten days to two weeks after this November

17 letter, I sent Steve Evans a letter retracting my offer of
November 17.
Q.

Do you have a copy of that letter with you?

A.

I do not have a copy of it with me.

Q.

To whom was that letter addressed?

A.

It was sent to Steve Evans.

Q.

What was its purpose?

A.

Its purpose was to let him know that the offer to

convey Sure-Tech to him and his parents was no longer on the
table.
MR. GDYON:

Thank you.

Nothing further.

MR. DANIELS:

You don't have a copy of that letter?

THE WITNESS:

I don't have it with me, no.

MR. DANIELS:

Do you have one in your file?

27

MR. 6UY0N:

None, your Honor.

THE COURT:

You may step down.

MR. DANIELS:

I would like to call Mr. Evans again,

briefly, for one rebuttal question.
STEVEN THOMAS EVANS,
called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DANIELS:
Q.

You were just here when Mr. Schultz testified that

shortly after the November letter he sent you a letter
rescinding his offer to convey the Sure-Tech interest to you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you ever receive such a letter?

A.

No, we did not.
MR. DANIELS:

No more questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. GUYON:
Q.

Mr. Evans, have you ever been convicted of a felony?
MR. DANIELS:

Your Honor, I need to say something

about this before we go on, if I may.

Mr. Schultz has filed

several papers in the other lawsuit, and now in this one,
wherein he says that Mr. Evans is a felon.

The truth is

Mr. Evans was convicted of a felony, that conviction was
expunged, and the record sealed.

So it is not a proper matter

29

1

THE COURT:

2

you to proffer that evidence.

3

to follow what has historically been adopted as the best

4

evidence rule, and that is the document or the writing itself.

5

And absent that, the Court is inclined to give little weight to

6

anything else.

7

way of proffer or by calling the witnesses, you are welcome to

8

do so.

9

If you would like, the Court will permit
Frankly, the Court is inclined

But if you would like to augment the record by

MR. GUYON:

10

in the courtroom.

11

proffer.

I can do that.

Both of them are present

I could probably do it more quickly by

12

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

13

MR. GUYON:

If Mr. Schultz were called as a witness

14

here at this point, he would testify that there were a number

15

of annual meetings, and would present documents for the first

16

annual meeting of Sure-Tech, a limited liability company, which

17

occurred January 26, 1994.

18

Charles Schultz.

19

Present were Robert Pett and

The only members

THE COURT:

—

Why don't you go from November of 1994,

20

which is the critical dates involving today's hearing, and then

21

proceed from that date forward, to May 30, 1995.

22
23

MR. GUYON:

The documents that I have, your Honor,

are November 24, 1993, which is a copy of the —

24

THE COURT:

Go to 1994.

25

MR. GUYON:

I am sorry.
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THE COURT:

Anything you would like to present or

proffer from November of 1994 to May 30 of 1995 would be
critical, in the Court's opinion.
MR. GUYON:

Here is the April 27, 1995 report, which

was filed with the Department of Corporations, indicating the
managers of Sure-Tech, Ltd., to be Robert J. Pett and Charles
Schultz, the members to be Robert Pett and Charles Schultz.
THE COURT:

Who prepared that document?

MR. GUYON:

That is prepared and I believe signed by

Charles Schultz.
THE COURT:

Was that signed by any other owner or

manager of Sure-Tech?
MR. GUYON:

No, your Honor, it is not.

There is a document entitled "Amendments,19 which I
believe was filed on the 10th day of April, 1995, which is the
purported articles of amendment, which are signed as dated,
April 30, I believe, 1995, and are signed by Lionel Koon, Fred
Evans and Steve Evans, including a statement that they are
authorized as members to sign that.
THE COURT:

What does that document purport to do?

MR. GUYON:

Purports to amend the articles of

organization.
THE COURT:

Does that include or exclude Mr. Schultz

from the business?
MR. GUYON:

Article 4 is amended to substitute Steve

54

Evans as registered agent.

Article 5 is amended to substitute

I believe it is his home address, 1902 Mary Dott Way, Salt Lake
City, and to appoint as managers of Sure-Tech Lionel Koon and
Fred B. Evans.
THE COURT:

The Court has that document.

MR. GUYON:

There is another document here entitled

the second annual meeting of Sure-Tech, Ltd.
February 19, 1995.

It is dated

Present at that meeting were Robert Pett

and Charles Schultz, identifying themselves as the only members
of the LLC.

This document is signed by Robert J. Pett and

Charles A. Schultz.

I believe, your Honor, those are the only

documents•
We would like to offer or at least have the Court
take judicial notice of other documents that relate to the
filings in there as part of the record.

I don't think they

relate, given the Court's ruling here.
Lisa Spivey is Mr. Schultz' secretary.
present in the courtroom.

She is

If she were called to testify, the

proffer that I would make on her behalf is that she assisted in
the preparation of the letter, withdrawing the offer that we
have discussed, that was made in November, and that she
personally inserted it in the U. S. mails.
THE COURT:

All right.

Anything further?

MR. GUYON:

The only thing is, for purposes of the

record, how to provide that these documents become part of it.
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THE COURT:
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2
3
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4
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5
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6

proffered
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object

on the basis of

7

Utah Rules of Evidence N o . 1 0 0 4 , commonly referred to "iMI tlio

9 J Court for its order excluding from evidence and striking fror
evidence any reference to that letter
THE COUH

The objection is suulainudj and the
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16

rules?
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•

THE COURT
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«
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as some additional testimony

osition *. t aonmembers^ . * this organization
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1

THE COURT:

2

You may.

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ,

3

called as a witness, being first duly sworn, was examined and

4

testified as follows:

5

DIRECT EXAMINATION

6

BY MR. GUYON:

7

Q.

8

under oath.

9

explain to the Court the circumstances under which this

Mr. Schultz, you have been sworn.

You are still

Mr. Schultz, quickly as possible, could you

10

corporation was organized, its compliance with the provisions

11

of the applicable code, and circumstances that led to your

12

just a background update into your letter of November of 1994.

13

A.

—

Sure-Tech, LLC, was formed, as it says in the

14

documents, for the purpose of investing in various companies

15

and projects and holding ownership interest in it.

16

was formed by Robert Pett and me.

17

times have been the only members and only managers of Sure-

18

Tech.

19

member.

20

reasons that Mr. Evans alluded to in his testimony.

21

had tax problems and both had tax liabilities.

Sure-Tech

Robert Pett and I at all

Mr. Evans, his parents, Mr. Koon, no one else was ever
They were never intended to be a member, for the very

22

They both

It is true they were to receive a portion of the

23

profits of EML, if they ever made any profits, and that was

24

distributed through Sure-Tech, but that was a separate

25

agreement.

They were never intended to be managers, never
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i ill! , EH i i lis ill Il :: • be members, because, if they w e r e , the IRS could

2

then seize their interest ;i n Sure-Tech.

3

they were never made member s

4

, II JI it i! i 1 1 in ! „ ill been distributed through Sure-Tech, i t would have

5

been distributed along the lines thai

6 I depositi^r v
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•I 11 iJin, i I in mi mi I

rhn initial meetinc

I

mi in i in

in i i I

II II 1 J

nutea
- . i.*„

those here as records, 1h« originals plus
—p^&&.
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-?ith the Department

Corporations, shown that the only

20 | members were Mr. Pett ana v '
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:t,, IBB ar** * ^^2.-.,

I IIi i iLiijlL

.._. -vans and

only

family w e r e never

members, never intended to be members, and for that very
reason.
The letter of November 17 was sent prior to the
hearing in this court on the motion to disqualify, and prior to
a number of other things taking place.

As I testified earlier,

when I terminated my business relationship with Mr. Evans and
Mr. Koon, I did not want to have anything further to do with
them.

I sent Mr. Evans' letter, specifically saying that we

would convey Sure-Tech to him and his family, because there was
a side agreement with EML that said that if EML goes out of
business, is dissolved, that 50 percent of the patent rights
would come to Sure-Tech.
Neither Mr. Pett nor I claim any interest in those
patent rights, and it was our intention Steve would always get
those.

If they came to Sure-Tech, we would convey those to

Steve.

We thought this would be the best way to facilitate

this.

But when Mr. Evans failed to appear for the hearing,

failed to do other things that were required, it cost us to
incur more time, litigation expense, more liability, we then
withdrew that offer.

We sent that off approximately ten days

to two weeks after this.

In fact, I think it was the day of

the hearing, disqualification hearing, or the day after.
MR. DANIELS:

I would ask that be stricken on the

basis of Rule 1004.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

The Court will give Counsel
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probably ::i i i 2 0 minutes.

* •< * -'-* ocument that was prepared and sent*
1 1 1 mi in1!

((III i

doubt

II

That

Miss Spivey can

Ill ::i ill: iii 11 1 11 lit iili Ill cii ^ ft :ii 1:

"Ill !h e ic: > e

jili :IE; ^ IIIIID ,/« : >

, This acceptance offer was received some

time after.

asked by Mr, Fishburn about this same document,
then it ha*

K*«.™

estified

rejected, and Mr* Evans accepted it on! y after

I llM I H | H < I

.. .

Mr. Evans n e v e r was a member of S u r e - T e c h .
Evans was never
membe:

imber «r I" Hure-Tech

Sure-Tech.

Fred

Bea Evans was n e v e r a

They were n e v e r i n t e n d e d t : • b si

Th e r e

a r e i in > documents t h a t i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e y a r e members, e v e r were
:i lit ended

.-* - -, and nev e r ha d III in 15 : i ntexnut ,
Also,

hadj

r e s p e c t t o tlii s a l l e g e d meeting t h a t t h e ]

1 n e v e r r e c e i v e d any n o t i c e of t h a t m e e t i n g .

i'n n v 11 'i 1

r fl c" n i \ 1 Ill

J 11 mi 1 1

in in 111 I I, 1 11 11

I"

III II in! I I II

IIIIII 1 "i 1 1 II i 11 \

i\ H

Mr. P e t t
IIIIII m IIIIII Hi o r 11

Ill II 112 j

could not have a meeting with respect It) Nu ire-Tech, because
t.hey weren't members, never were members.
Mllli"..

(.linn "' mi ni fsii!

il II iii III ni I

Ill

Ill '

I1 IIIIII 111111 1 n o d

II il

the best way possib] e.
THE COURT:

Any questions?

60

morning, dealing with the authority to enter into the
settlement agreement and the order of dismissal being signed by
the Court, the Court finds and rules as follows:
was set for 9:00 a.m., May 30, 1995.
eleven.

The hearing

It is now ten after

The estimate for the hearing was one hour.

The Court

still has not received any letter from the office of
Mr. Schultz, indicating that there was a change in the position
of Mr. Schultz to convey his interest to the Evanses on the
Sure-Tech company.
And the Court finds that the best evidence rule
applies, and, absent any document to the contrary, the Court
does not give any substantial weight to the representations
made that after November 17, 1994, and before January 9 of
1995, or before April 9 of 1995, there was ever any change in
Mr. Schultz' willingness to convey his interest in Sure-Tech.
The Court further finds as follows:
of events are as follows:

The chronology

November 17, 1994, Mr. Evans is the

recipient of a letter authored by Mr. Schultz, wherein he
states as follows:

"It is my intention to convey my interest

in Sure-Tech, and Bob," assuming that's Bob Pett, "will also
convey his interest in Sure-Tech to you or to whoever you
direct.

Advise me to whom you wish it conveyed.

I will not

dismiss the case against EML so that you or whomever you direct
can decide what to do."
months later.

That's precisely what occurred several

"However, I am going to withdraw as counsel for
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MAY 3 0 1995
SALT LAKE QOUNT£

^QStf&VO lhp u>*$jfo-YX*-ver u\vfc

Attorney for Defendants

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

SURE-TECH, 1,1,(••,

)

ORDER OF
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DISMISSAL

vs.
E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., ECOLOGY
MANAGEMENT,
LTD. ami WASTE
PRODUCTS, INC.,

Civxl No. 940902389 CV
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendants.

Based
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of
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dated
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day of April, 1995, and for good cause showing, it is hereby;
ORDERED,
dismissed

with

that
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above

prejudice,

entitled

each parly
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and fees.
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Attorney at Law
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S u r e - T e c h , LLC v . E.M.L. P r o j e c t s ,
Our F i l e No.- 1 8 7 4 1 . 0 0 1

;

DopjryClortc

et al,

D e a r Mr. Guyon:
I received the copy of the Affidavit of Lisa Spivey that you
sent me along with the attachments. I didn't have any idea that
the letter of November 22, 1994, was the letter that Charles
Schultz was referring to. Steve did receive that letter, and I
have a copy of it in my file. When Mr. Schultz testified that he
had sent a letter to Steve revoking his offer to return his
interest in Sure-Tech, I thought he must be referring to another
letter because I don't read the letter of November 22 as saying
that.
Very truly yours,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

^cdMQtpdli
Scott
SD:cah
cc:

Honorable Pat B. Brians/
Richard K. Nebeker
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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d a t e d Ma} 3 1
Dated

Mi i

Il ,irM
'"X

'

^^

\

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SURE-TECH, LLC,
Plaintiff,

COURT RULING

vs.
E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., et al. ,
Defendants.

Civil No. 940902389 CV
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

Schultz' Motion to Vacate Order of Dismissal is denied
DATED this
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date of August, 1995.

JudgePatBri

w ik-w vuu.i irv

Date:
Clerk:
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Charles A. Schultz, (4760)
Pro se and as attorney for Robert J. Pett
P.O. Box 526382
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-6382
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
SURE-TECH, LLC,

:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 940902389CV

E.M.L. PROJECTS, LTD., ECOLOGY
MANAGEMENT, LTD., and WASTE
PRODUCTS, INC.,

Judge:

Pat B. Brian

Appeal No.

950343

Defendants.
--oooOooo—
C O M E N O W , Robert J. Pett and Charles A. Schultz and appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court from the Order of Dismissal entered against
them on May 30, 1995, and the Court Ruling denying their Rule 60
Motion entered August 9, 1995.
Dated this

day of August 1995,

Charles A. Schultz
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